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Abstract
The “bullshit” construct used within social influence involves presenting ambiguous message
content as an ersatz substitute for missing reasoning. This pseudo-reasoning combines with
clearer source or affect cues that drive the target toward a desired conclusion. Bullshit receptivity
(BSR) has presented a popular focus of research, especially considering the use of pseudoreasoning within viral disinformation (Van Bavel et al, 2020). Most BSR research has involved
non-experimental correlational tests with trait-like, individual cognitive variables, their
explanation of BSR’s cause remaining limited and inconsistent (Pennycook et al, 2015).
However, influence tactics employing bullshit commonly derive their effects from fulfilling
targets’ motivated needs and addressing their accessible knowledge structures (Brown et al,
2019; Carpenter, 2017; Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999). Attitude and knowledge structures
partially emerge from and depend upon individuals’ connections to the groups with which they
identify (Smith & Hogg, 2008; Terry & Hogg, 1996), and self-uncertain individuals exhibit
attraction to group-based messages that reduce their uncertainty (Hogg, 2007). This project
tested the hypothesis that self-uncertainty and message cues identifying sources as sharing social
identities with subjects positively predict the acceptance of pseudo-reasoning and compliant
responses to compliance gaining messages accompanied by pseudo-reasoning.
Keywords: bullshit receptivity, social identity, compliance gaining
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Chapter One: Introduction
Under uncertainty, individuals make judgments about their experiences in the same way
that scientists test hypotheses: They encounter new data and weigh it against premises that exist
within their personal, observational, and collective spheres of understanding – in theoretical
terms, behaving as “lay epistemics” (Kruglanski & Webster, 1994; Kruglanski et al, 2010). Some
individuals, more than others, exhibit tendencies to find patterns in random stimuli, more
liberally assigning fit between what is observed and what is known, such as in the case of an
individual discovering animal shapes within a scattering of stars (Walker, 2019). In
communication, individuals share their patterns of understanding via strategic interaction,
through which they find and negotiate meaning (Higgins, 1992). Meaning is co-oriented between
people within communication episodes that coordinate message goals, message structure, and
message interpretations situated within social expectations and constraints (Knapp, 2011).
When influence is the goal, individuals use communication to coordinate their wants and
needs with the goals and actions of others – in the case of compliance gaining, for example,
influencing agents use communication to alter a message target’s behavior in the direction of
doing something they otherwise would not do (Miller et al, 1987). In some situations,
communication may occur between an influencing agent and an influence target in which the
agent, unable or unwilling to make claims or compliance gaining messages supported by
reasoning, may instead turn to communication patterns that look like reasoning, but lack the
traditionally known features of high-quality reasoning, such as specificity, concreteness,
relevance, and/or logical connections with evidence (Dynel, 2011; Grice, 1989).
Considering this message function and requisite structural choice, some researchers have
addressed the use of non-reasoning, or placebic information (Langer et al, 1978), which uses
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mundane, often redundant statements to act as a placeholder for reasoning when a message target
is not motivated to attend carefully to a compliance gaining message. Alternatively, message
agents may tailor their communication of pseudo-reasoning (see Kuhn, 1991) to contain
intentionally low-clarity elements – such as ambiguity, abstraction, or statements out of context –
which offer communication that looks like meaningful information, but actually derives its effect
from capitalizing on a target’s assigning meaning based on familiar premises, i.e. their attitudes,
norms, and intuition. Agents employing pseudo-reasoning strategically pick message elements
and resist clarification just enough for a target to fill in the blanks, as they are motivated to
apprehend meaning and focus on information relevant to a conclusion (Kruglanski & Thompson,
1999).
Harry Frankfurt (2005) described this ubiquitous pattern of communication behavior as
“bullshit,” and named it as a way in which individuals maintain exchanges with one another by
casually saying words just to say words, being motivated by little concern for expressing truth. In
tests of attributions of message believability and quality, some individuals appear more
susceptible than others to influence tactics employing the pseudo-reasoning of "bullshit,"
showing "bullshit receptivity" (BSR; Pennycook et al, 2015). While Frankfurt (2005) explained
it more in terms of low-stakes, low-effort, lightly deceptive talk, bullshit has garnered popular
interest concerning the social issues of viral disinformation and epistemic fragmentation
(Harrington, 2020; Van Bavel, 2020), as bad faith actors employ difficult-to-clarify backing for
the presentation of spurious claims (Bengoetxea, 2017). Bullshit as a construct, however,
remains inconsistently conceptualized and operationalized across studies.
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The traditionally accepted view of effective influence messages posits that good
persuasion relies on the presentation of clear evidence logically connected to a claim (Grice,
1989). Instead, bullshit may represent, much like placebic information (Langer et al, 1978), a
tactical form of evidence replacement. Unlike placebic information, however, its effect may not
be limited to low-effort compliance gaining, as tests of BSR show subjects attributing
profoundness and likeability to its ambiguous claims (Čavojová et al, 2020; Pennycook et al,
2015). Individuals' processing of messages occurs as a result of the interaction of their cognitive
ability, their motivation to evaluate, and the ease of understanding built into the message content
(Carpenter, 2010; Kruglanski et al, 2006). While the majority of bullshit research has addressed
targets' deficits in cognitive ability, only simple correlational analyses have shown associations
with higher-order motivating factors, such as religious adherence (Pennycook et al, 2015), and
without very much specific experimental attention to the need fulfillment often theorized to drive
influence (Brown et al, 2019; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004).
In most influence research, social scientists induce perceptions of high quality persuasion
by controlling the presence or non-presence of evidential statements, but bullshit represents a
difference in evidence clarity. Regarding message structure, bullshit strategy commonly presents
the effects of combining ambiguous verbiage with unambiguous source and paralinguistic cues
(such as known scientific terms cast with more advanced and lesser-known terms within
fabricated complex theoretical statements; Evans et al, 2020). Studies examining bullshit as a
message type by adjusting the simple cues and ambiguity-increasing devices within message
structure may reveal differing influence effects, further explicating the mechanisms behind social
influence (Carpenter & Dryden Henningsen, 2011). Simple differences in message element’s
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clarity may steer message targets toward evaluation based on the cues that represent the clearest
path to a syllogistic conclusion (Erb et al, 2007; Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999).
In particular, an examination of bullshit draws theoretical interest because it may
articulate the potential of intentionally ambiguous claims to capitalize on the frequently abstract
premises that drive syllogistic reasoning (Gigerenzer, 1991). These premises exist as prior
knowledge structures, attitudes, and beliefs supplied, at least in part, by individuals' group
identification (Eaton et al, 2008). For individuals identifying with a salient group (Wyer, 2010),
an influence agent communicating identifiable in-group cues may moderate the effect bullshit
message construction has on BSR and message acceptance in message evaluation. This effect
may especially emerge for self-uncertain individuals (Hogg, 2007), who ostensibly derive greater
meaning from the ambiguities of bullshit because of their needs, such as group belongingness
and uncertainty reduction, that the messages purport to fulfill (Brown et al, 2019; Kruglanski et
al, 2006; Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999).
This set of studies addressed the overall hypothesis that influence messages employing
bullshit pseudo-reasoning significantly and positively affect message acceptance and compliance
when highly self-uncertain individuals perceive the message source as sharing their social
identity. Similar to Pennycook et al’s (2015) original BSR explication, the processing of bullshit
messages may involve an interruption in message evaluation, as described according to the
Spinozan model of information processing (Carpenter, 2010, 2017; Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert et al,
1993). Unlike most prior tests of BSR as an individual difference variable, however, this
research sought to test receptivity to bullshit as an artifact of message processing resulting from
the aforementioned uncertainty and social identity variables' interference in message evaluation.
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First, this project sought to clarify and operationalize a replicable bullshit message
strategy and illuminate some of bullshit’s effects as a social influence variable, particularly as a
low-quality (in terms of message clarity) substitute for reasoning. Second, this project puts forth
investigations of the social causes underlying message believability and requisite compliance,
particularly in terms of individuals’ processing of messages based on the attitudinal structures
made familiar (and therefore accessible) to them via their group self-categorizations. This second
purpose utilizes and expands an understanding of communication behavior predicted by
Uncertainty-Identity Theory (UIT; Hogg, 2007), which builds upon the family of theories
informed by Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).
Literature Review
The Bullshit Concept
Regarding the bullshit concept’s definition, researchers have differed over the qualifying
criteria for bullshit communication patterns, and different scholars use the term discrepantly.
Frankfurt (2005) focused his rhetorical analysis on the phenomenon of idle talk among
interactants enlisting situational relativistic approaches to making meaning, whereas Cohen
(2002) and those following focused on the intentional ambiguity or equivocality of message
structures, mainly used as social influence strategies. Meibauer (2016) lent further articulation to
Frankfurt (2005), outlining a sender-side definition of bullshit according to four pragmatic
criteria: the assertion of truth in a claim, the lack of concern for the truth or falsehood of said
claim, the motivation to hide or deflect attention from said lack of concern, and the presentation
of unwarranted certainty for the truth of the claim. Three out of the four Meibauer (2016) criteria
address antecedent psychological conditions. To examine bullshit’s explication as a

6
communication strategy, it is prudent in research to investigate psychological and social
antecedents and conditions, message structures, message interpretation, and communication
outcomes within an influence process.
The Functions of Bullshit. Communicators of bullshit seek to alter their audience’s
apprehension of reality, either concerning impressions about them or evaluations of their claims.
Especially when they lack the willingness or ability to provide reasoning under expectations for
doing so, they turn to pseudo-reasoning (Cohen, 2002; Dynel, 2011; Meibauer, 2016, Petrocelli
et al, 2019). Similar phenomena have emerged as subjects of communication research under the
conceptualizations of equivocation (Bavelas et al, 1990) and strategic ambiguity (Eisenberg,
1984). However, while scholars mainly characterize equivocation as an interpersonal conflict
avoidance tactic and strategic ambiguity a meta-strategy for inviting cooperative dialogue in
groups, bullshit has mainly represented the focus of study for researchers examining the credulity
of influence targets, especially regarding the kind of persuasive tactics involved in the
dissemination of disinformation and doubt (Bengoetxea, 2017; Pennycook & Rand, 2018; Van
Bavel et al, 2020).
Individuals, such as politicians and religious idealogues, who must publicly appear to
have easy solutions even when possessing none, may craft bullshit influence messages meant to
attract followers or reinforce lines of group solidarity around themselves (Hogg, 2018; Meibauer,
2016; Petrocelli, 2018; Spicer, 2020). Bullshit thrives in information environments in which
prestige or authority lack objective (or clear consensual) definition, such as the arts (Turpin et al,
2020). Bullshitters tend to use bullshit when they can reasonably predict that their audience will
accept it and generally ignore its particulars (Petrocelli, 2018). Non-targets, or individuals for
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whom the message lacks familiarity, value relevance, or social goal fulfillment may more likely
find bullshit messages disturbingly unclarifiable and therefore worthy of rejection. This reflects
prior findings concerning the role of information accessibility in persuasive message processing
(Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999; Russell & Reimer, 2020).
In most bullshit literature, scholars name the sender's mind state as the primary defining
attribute of bullshit, and scholars have identified bullshit as a message type evincing that lowtruth-concern mind state. Within a communication episode, however, which involves a
transactional and continuous process of meaning sharing through the intentional use of symbolic
messages between people, the standards of clarity, accuracy, and plausibility undergo mutual
negotiation between interactants (Miller & Steinberg, 1975). Situated within an act of attempted
influence, message agents concern themselves with altering the judgment formations of their
targets, which in turn inform those targets' persuasibility and/or compliance (Kruglanski &
Thompson, 1999).
In social influence, bullshit maneuvers the target into accepting, for example, an
impression of the agent as capable of fulfilling the target’s needs (Petrocelli, 2018), without due
verification or clarification of what a sender claims within message content (Cohen, 2002). The
agent holds the motivation to create an impression but lacks the motivation or resources to cast
unambiguous claims (Petrocelli et al, 2019); meanwhile, the message target bears the burden of
assigning the missing verification and clarity. Motivation for this may come from personality,
normed pressure, or deficits in needs such as belongingness (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Within
bullshit research, scholars have rarely named the influence goal bullshitters pursue nor tested it
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explicitly, though some experiments have tested specific goals, such as targets' re-sharing of
information (Čavojová et al, 2018) and appraising abstract art as valuable (Turpin et al, 2020).
The Form of Bullshit. Bullshit pseudo-reasoning avoids clarity, instead depending on
the receiver to assume it (Cohen, 2002), and this avoidance of clarity, fulfilling Meibauer's
(2016) criterion of obfuscating both intent and low concern for truth, can be carried out via a
variety of linguistic devices, such as the communication of non-falsifiable statements, equivocal
word choice (presenting the possibility of multiple meanings), use of esoteric or sesquipedalian
language, use of exaggeration, or appeals to anonymous bandwagon authority (Jurkovič et al,
2018; Pennycook & Rand, 2018; Spicer, 2020; Turpin et al, 2019). Thompson (2016) pointed out
that bullshit in advertising tends to involve mechanical elements such as passive voice
(obfuscating a clause's subject), vague terms or front-loaded qualifiers (e.g. "value" or "this
simple solution"), and conditional statements that make ad hoc rescue easier.
So far, scholars have yet to develop a consistent list of sufficiency criteria for the content
that signifies a message as bullshit, though Cohen (2002) and Dynel (2011) described the core
qualification: No immediate clarification occurs from message content or context, favoring a
general impression of plausibility over accuracy. Pennycook et al's (2015) tests of bullshit
receptivity described the construct in terms of communication lacking substantive meaning while
expecting that meaning to be intuitively assumed by those receptive to the message. Pennycook
et al's (2015) initial test of their BSR scale used, within the so-called "pseudo-profound" domain,
excerpts of bullshit taken from an online widget and tweets from spiritual idealogue Deepak
Chopra. An example from the widget reads like so: "The goal of ultra-sentient particles is to
plant the seeds of balance rather than delusion. Inspiration requires exploration." Partially, this
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passage qualifies as bullshit because, through the choice of ambiguous and pretentious language,
it makes general assertions without necessarily pointing to falsifiable or readily apprehensible
information.
Regarding variations in its operationalization, Jurkovič et al (2018) and Čavojová et al
(2020) applied Pennycook et al's (2015) operationalization to bullshit outside the transcendental
domain, seeking to test examples of its general usage, and altered definitional statements to
contain inaccurate claims supported by figurative flourishes, such as metaphor. Evans et al
(2020) created a test of "scientific bullshit" by cobbling together esoteric words from the physics
discipline and organizing them into false theoretical descriptions. Turpin et al (2019), in a test of
abstract art appraisals, created bullshit titles for art pieces by using principles underlying
"International Art English," a pattern of message construction in art criticism that features
collocations such as paired like terms (e.g. "external reality") and converting adjectives and verbs
into nouns (e.g. "potentiality" out of "potential"). Gligoric et al (2020), in an operationalization
of political bullshit slogans and political program descriptions, used references to ill-defined
abstract terms, such as "America" in a collective personality sense.
Conceptual Clarity. The bullshit described by the last decade of literature suggest a
superordinate communication strategy that subsumes and elaborates upon phenomena already
known to the communication discipline: those of strategic ambiguity and equivocation.
Equivocation, similar to Frankfurt's (2005) definition of bullshit as "short of lies," involves the
communication of intentionally unclear information, particularly information that could be
interpreted numerous ways, for the purposes of deceptively avoiding the difficulty associated
with either truth-telling or unequivocal lying (Bavelas et al, 1990; Bello et al, 2016; Buller &
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Burgoon, 1996; McCornack et al, 2014). In most equivocation research, its expression
accompanies defensive or avoidant behavior in response to conflict, seen as a politeness strategy
more often than a concerted influence strategy, though its usage appears to occur most often, at
least based on self-reported responses to scenarios, in informal situations among friends (Bello,
2000). In this sense, parallel to bullshit’s use of pseudo-reasoning as an influence strategy,
equivocation involves the careful introduction of variably explicit pseudo-information in favor of
an individual maintaining a desired impression or level of disclosure.
Eric Eisenberg's line of research on organizational communication relying on strategic
ambiguity (Eisenberg, 1984) similarly involves the programmatic usage of carefully adjusted
clarity in collaborative settings to blur intergroup or inter-perspective lines: An ambiguous or
equivocal claim has the benefit of looking like a puzzle piece to which many different pieces (or
points of view) may affix. Spicer (2020), in his meta-analytic review of organizational bullshit,
similarly found that leaders (formal or otherwise) commonly used bullshit to inculcate a feeling
of community, especially in groups that indulged its usage, but that if overused, similarly to
equivocation in the interpersonal context (Edwards & Bello, 2001), it could result in diminished
trust and/or negative attributions of a bullshitter's competence (Christensen et al, 2019).
Eventually, message targets will seek clearer information.
For the sake of parsimony, it may be useful to the social sciences to conceptualize
bullshit as a superordinate construct of influence behavior, comprising the communication of
pseudo-reasoning message structures for the purpose of achieving influence goals. This would
subsume equivocation and some strategic ambiguity patterns, as much as those patterns feature
pseudo-reasoning-based influence attempts on, for example, attitudes regarding relational
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stability or perceived cohesion of work groups. Some recent research has divided bullshit into
evasive and persuasive functions (Littrell et al, 2021), but these represent only two directions.
Researchers especially interested in antisocial realms of social influence may focus on
compliance gaining bullshit uttered for the sake of gaining asymmetrical benefit for the
bullshitter. However, such an undertaking will require further explication for the bullshit
construct and its interpretation in terms of its situatedness within communication episodes and
relationships.
For one of its purposes, this research proposed the development of testable bullshit
messages fitting characteristics established in the literature before examining them within
influence processes with cognitive and behavioral goals. For the sake of parsimony, therefore,
this research project adhered to the following conceptual definition based mainly on the Cohen
(2002) line of consideration and Meibauer’s (2016) criticism alongside tests of bullshit strategies
as tactics of influence (e.g. Gligoric et al, 2020; Gligoric & Vilotijević, 2020; Turpin et al, 2019):
Bullshit represents a superordinate communication strategy that replaces missing or unwanted
reasoning with pseudo-reasoning. The communication of pseudo-reasoning commonly involves
the enlisting of evidential claims that, in service to an influence goal, combine distinctive cues
for desired impression formation with verbal message structures that prevent clarification. In the
case of compliance gaining, this influence tactic would concern itself with engendering
likeability of the agent and worthiness of the compliance gaining message.
Bullshit violates Grice's (1989) second maxim of quality, regarding the presentation of
evidence for a claim; it carefully blurs facts or cues in the direction of its influence goal without
attention to concrete or thorough evidence (Dynel, 2011). Bullshit represents the use of
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replacement pseudo-reasoning, like Kuhn’s (1991) “pseudo-evidence,” which involves the lack
of a warrant tying anecdotal evidence to a generalizable claim. Though this suggests classically
understood low-quality argumentation from Grice's (1989) or Toulmin's (2003) post-hoc
judgment, it may fulfill a priori determinations of quality judged by the activation of message
receivers' attitude structures.
Bullshit Receptivity
Persuasive messages show particular effectiveness when they address salient elements of
an individual's semantic network surrounding a subject of communication (Russell & Reimer,
2020). In simpler terms, individuals may more likely accept persuasive messages containing
evidence that seems familiar to their experience. Regarding the kind of bullshit that Pennycook
et al (2015) and Evans et al (2020) operationalized, intentionally unclear or complex terms stood
couched in collocations familiar to their respective domains (New Age philosophy and science).
Furthermore, the answer to the question of why certain individuals in certain situations seem
more receptive to bullshit may lie in examining the goal motivations receivers have that bullshit
purports to satisfy (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999). Bullshit literature has generally lacked such
examination, especially within controlled experimentation (Brown et al, 2019; Gligoric &
Vilotijević, 2020).
Pennycook et al (2015) set a precedent for other research in the psychological discipline
for BSR as an individual difference variable, approaching high-BSR individuals as cognitive
misers lacking the wherewithal to attend diligently to low-quality claims. Casting BSR as merely
an error in judgment, however, may represent a faulty description of its functionality in the
context of human cognition's evolution and the ways individuals communicate to organize their
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communities (Christensen et al, 2019; Spicer, 2020) or simply share reality (Higgins, 1992). In
the variable's short history, researchers have found significant negative associations between
BSR and both cognitive reflective ability and analytical ability (Čavojová et al, 2018; Čavojová
et al, 2020; Pennycook et al, 2015). Some findings across studies found relationships between
BSR and certain socialized preferences or approaches to epistemology, such as religiosity, faith
in intuition, and paranormal belief (Bainbridge et al, 2018; Čavojová, 2020; Pennycook et al,
2015; Walker et al, 2019). These findings suggest BSR’s antecedents lying within attachment to
groups or communication environments that normatively indulge more relativistic epistemic
judgments in line with Spicer (2020) and Christensen et al (2019). In some analyses, personality
factors suggesting proclivities for lenient judgments or creative theorizing represented one
direction for potential causes for BSR while associations with needs for fear reduction related to
developmental trauma (e.g. conspiracy ideation) represented another (Čavojová et al, 2020;
Pennycook et al, 2015).
Regardless of pragmatic definition, receivers commonly interpret the communication
strategy of equivocation, or insincere sidestepping of information, as deception (Edwards &
Bello, 2001). However, explicit truths as well as lies represent cognitive difficulty and potential
social uncertainty, therefore incremental adjustments and variations in equivocality are common
to conversation (McCornack et al, 2014). Treated similarly as an individual difference variable,
scholars across studies have found low variance in the ability to detect deception (Bond &
DePaulo, 2006), and when deception is detected, the process is less akin to the activation of
observational abilities and more associated with effective exchanges of communication content
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in context (Levine, 2014). BSR may be more prudently analyzed as an artifact of message
evaluation influenced by message structure, function, and environment.
Pennycook et al (2015), in their focus on an individual proclivity to assume meaning in
the meaningless, theorized that BSR resulted from an haphazardly arrested message evaluation
process, but limited their analysis to the individual cognition aspects of that process. To date,
most bullshit research has involved the development of context-centered bullshit receptivity
scales instead of addressing bullshit's place as a purposeful influence tactic or as a means of
coordinating meaning between interactants. The rules of communication associated with the
contexts under study have received little attention (Walker et al, 2019). To evaluate bullshit as
reasonable or impressive without rejecting its claims may represent an advantage to survival
(Brown et al, 2019), inasmuch as maintaining an "open mind" to others' messages fosters social
inclusion. Bullshit messages may also concern issues relevant to the groups with which
individuals identify, and individuals further ensure social survival by conforming to their groups'
norms and displaying adherence to familiar group attitudes and beliefs (Hogg, 2007; Hohman &
Hogg, 2015). Communication about collective norms represents the vehicle by which individuals
achieve social cohesion (Hogg & Giles, 2012), and the strategic use of ambiguous messages, or
messages that agents have tailored to fit the perspectives of many different targets, often
facilitates that cohesion (Higgins, 1992).
Message Processing and Bullshit Acceptance
Functionally, influencing agents employ bullshit to divert message receivers from close
cognitive judgments of message content in favor of impression management cues, therefore the
effectiveness of bullshit as an influence tactic depends on either deflecting attention or

15
capitalizing on the prior attitudes of influence targets. Deflecting attention generally has a
positive effect on low-effort message evaluation and acceptance (Dolinski et al, 2002; Gilbert,
1993). Conversely, when targets slow down their interpretation and comprehension of a message
and focus their attention, they may detect bullshit more consistently (Brown et al, 2019).
Especially inexperienced analytical thinkers, or individuals labeled “lay epistemics,” may lack
the ability to detect bullshit, but their activated goal motivations have a significant effect
(Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999). Message judgments may shift in the presence of even
minimally different cues, such as passive voice (Carpenter & Dryden Henningsen, 2011).
Furthermore, with tactically ambiguous or "obscurantist" (Cohen, 2002) message content,
influence targets, especially under uncertainty, may latch onto the message evidences (e.g.
source cues) that they more easily understand (Kruglanski et al, 2006), especially if those
evidences suggest relevance to a conclusive premise provided by their group identification.
Bullshit arguments, especially displaying in-group-relevant cues, present "weak" evidences
sometimes using difficult-to-decipher words but asserting easy-to-understand certainty (or
whatever other attribution represents the bullshitter's goal) and present themselves as already
evaluated. The combination of ambiguous verbal arguments with unambiguous source or
paralinguistic cues generally results in targets' biasing of their judgments in the direction of
unambiguous cues, but only when those messages contain cues or statements that show
congruence with targets' latitude of acceptance or similarity to their prior attitudes (Erb et al,
2007). A bullshitter presenting an attitude or information that challenges a receiver's attitude or
knowledge runs the risk of eliciting a combative response, within which the receiver may more
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likely express higher expectations for clarity and transparency (i.e. the opposite of bullshit) from
the message agent (Bohner et al, 2002; Buller & Burgoon, 1996).
The judgment of a message as believable or a behavior as reasonable based on the
source's perceived membership in the receiver's in-group represents a phenomenon familiar to
social influence theorists (Maitner et al, 2010; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al, 1987; Wyer,
2010). Furthermore, the closer the relational ties of message source and receiver, the more biased
toward assigning believability a receiver may become (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Buller et al,
1994), and the more resistant the receiver may feel toward the potentially dangerous uncertainty
reduction that knowing unambiguous information may cause (Afifi & Matsunaga, 2008).
However, before the intervention of social and relational factors, individuals may attribute the
believability or reasonableness of messages by default as a necessary condition for information
comprehension. Pennycook et al (2015) cited this argument from Gilbert (1991) as a potential
cause for the misapprehension of bullshit as meaningful. Daniel Gilbert based his position on the
writings of 17th-Century philosopher Baruch Spinoza in contrast to the generally accepted
assumptions about information processing popularized by 17th-Century philosopher Rene
Descartes. Descartes', or the "Cartesian," position presupposes that individuals make choices
about what they believe after a time of comprehension, suggesting that messages, on input,
maintain a sort of qualitative liminality until later judgment. The Spinozan position, however,
offers an alternative to the presupposition of immediate rational choice on belief, arguing that
belief or agreement occurs first before closer evaluation later. This perspective shows at least
rudimentary convergence with contemporary positions on the automaticity of behavior in the
moment and post-hoc judgments of structured belief (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Zajonc, 1980).
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Gilbert (1991) argued for Spinoza's approach using the metaphor of a library. In the
Cartesian library, new books entering the collection would remain untagged until further reading
and evaluated as containing either fiction or nonfiction, subsequently tagged as such. Under the
Spinozan system, all new books get tagged as nonfiction, and then judgment about the veracity
of their contents informs re-tagging upon later reading. The initial tagging of all books as
nonfiction represented the initiation of a message interpretation and evaluation process similar to
an assembly line, and the introduction of interfering information or emotional distraction could
result in knowledge structures stamped as acceptable prematurely (Gilbert, 1991, 1993). Gilbert
(1991) also proposed a mean between Cartesian and Spinozan conceptualizations, in which the
acceptance function occurs still earlier (and takes less of a cognitive load) than rejection, but may
not necessarily occur simultaneously with comprehension: a “Cartozan” process.
Carpenter (2010), noting that the Spinozan argument yielded support but lacked an actual
model structure, turned to Hastie and Park's (1986) description of “on-line” processing, which
involves the transfer of environmental stimulus information into working memory before
processing through a cognitive judgment operator. In other words, individuals process the
information as soon as they encounter it. When on-line processing becomes more likely, such as
during exposure to stronger arguments (containing more evidences) and more complex
arguments (resulting in slower, more deliberate, processing), targets' need to evaluate activates
and the strength of arguments becomes more detectable (Carpenter, 2010; 2018). Otherwise,
when message targets feel distracted or experience cognitive load appraised as unassailable in
the moment, memory-based processing activates, delaying evaluations and leaving message
properties unevaluated in long-term memory (Hastie & Park, 1986). Bullshit purveyors normally
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present their claims under time constraint or low expectations of concerted attention (Meibauer,
2016; Petrocelli, 2018).
Pure memory-based processing rarely occurs (Hastie & Park, 1986), and bullshit may
derive its effect from whether or not targets process the message disfluently, as in Brown et al's
(2019) experiment yielding greater detection, or in a spontaneous on-line fashion, in which it
enters working memory. Still, an arresting of evaluation may occur because of the rapid (and
emotionally driven) activation of prior attitude structures concerning the object of
communication. Interrupted memory-based processing may not necessarily lead targets to an
acceptance default, as some tests of the Spinozan model have shown that subject knowledge or
domain familiarity may lead targets to rapid judgment operations, possibly contradicting past
support for Spinozan processing and calling for a more flexible model definition (Nadarevic &
Erdfelder, 2019; Richter et al, 2009). Street & Richardson (2015) found that individuals tested
for message processing, when given a choice, more often expressed indecision rather than
commitment to a hard binary of message acceptance or nonacceptance, suggesting that
acceptance does not necessarily represent a given part of initial message comprehension. This
may suggest credibility for Gilbert’s (1991) “Cartozan” proposal.
In the case of compliance gaining messages, as with most influence messages (Forgas,
2019), the suggestion of any positive emotional valence in a request usually predicts compliance.
Some scholars have described individuals' day-to-day communication, in general, as mostly
mindless (Dolinski, 2002; Langer, 1978), determined by learned or instinctive action programs
triggered by environmental or emotional cues. Langer et al (1978) and similar studies (Dolinski,
2002; Liang et al, 2013) have supported the hypothesis that individuals presented with low-effort
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requests show greater likelihood of compliance in the mere presence of placebic information, or
communication that sounds similar to reasoning while containing nothing but obvious nonreasoning. The resulting rates of compliance do not differ significantly from the results of
messages containing substantive or non-obvious information, though increased effort requested
from the target results in a reduced effect, as does the triggering of information recall about
norms of request acceptability or pro/antisociality (Boster et al, 2001; Kotowski, 2020; Langer et
al, 1978). The persistent addition of reasoning to request messages after an initial request
utterance, or the general strengthening of reasoning-based arguments, also tends to increase
compliance rates beyond the "mindless" baseline (Boster et al, 2009). If the pseudo-reasoning of
bullshit-laden requests follows the pattern described by Pennycook et al's (2015)
operationalization, its mere triggering of heuristics of familiarity or registering of reasoning
should make its effect similar to placebic information requests, resulting in rates of compliance
comparable to direct-request-plus-reason tactics.
BSR and Social Groups
BSR and Group Identification. When animals lack the competitive ability to survive
within their ecosystems, such as exposure to predators or traits that seem unfit in the perceptions
of prospective mates, they develop adaptations, such as camouflage or rituals of performance, in
order to secure an edge on natural selection (Mokkonen & Lindstedt, 2016). Human animals, on
the individual and group level, show similar behavioral adaptations, some of which take the form
of patterns of influence, such as bullshit strategies. Effective bullshitters are effective
communicators, using their intelligence to achieve their competitive goals within their
ecosystems (Turpin et al, 2021). Individuals who show lenient judgment toward bullshit may be
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regarded as credulous from some perspectives, but influence processes represent coordinated
exchanges affected by relational context (Echterhoff et al, 2009; Miller & Steinberg, 1975), and
humans have evolved patterns of relationship-seeking and cooperation by merit of those
behaviors’ resulting survival advantage (West et al, 2007). The assumption of honesty appears to
be humans’ benign interpretation default in a similar vein (Levine, 2014). Hence, BSR, or the
tendency to assign meaning to bullshit’s pseudo-reasoning, does not necessarily represent
dangerous credulity, and lack of cognitive reflective ability does not necessarily represent its
central cause (Littrell et al, 2022).
Though cognitive ability has proven a somewhat consistent negative predictor of BSR
(Pennycook et al, 2015; Pennycook & Rand, 2018; Petrocelli et al, 2018) as well as the
habituated communication of bullshit (Littrell et al, 2020), the characterizing of BSR as a form
of individual bias or error proclivity presents a problem, as it suggests a more prescriptive
approach assuming the existence of objectively "correct" judgment. Gigerenzer (1991) argued
that, concerning especially the tests of heuristics and biases carried out by Kahneman and
Tversky's (1973) research program, errors of individual probabilistic judgment tend to arise from
test subjects' access to information, the kind of reasoning intuited as having associations with
particular domains of problem solving, and interactions with subjects' social environments.
Spicer (2020) argued for the practice of bullshitting as fulfilling the social or
organizational functions of establishing and maintaining network membership and defining the
attitudinal boundaries of speech communities. Reciprocally, individuals receptive to bullshit may
veer toward that receptivity as a response to in-group membership cues and trust in in-group
knowledge structures (Eaton et al, 2008; Wyer, 2010). Scholars must interrogate the structure of
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environments perceived by message targets, especially through the lens of community
knowledge, in order to understand influence effects (Russell & Reimer, 2020). The perceived
stability or unwanted change in an environment may lead individuals to make problem solving
decisions that appear advantageous to survival, whether outside parties qualify those decisions as
“error” or not (Gigerenzer, 1991). For example, "winning" with one's in-group may, in certain
circumstances, represent more of an adaptive advantage than accurate evaluation.
The judgment of information, forming of attitudes and beliefs, and requisite translation of
attitudes into behavior has consistently shown emergence from the activation of internalized
social norms (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Schultz et al, 2008). Targets of influence messages
generally behave in sync with the perceived normed behaviors of other individuals in their
environment, especially as influence messages focus on those normed behaviors and
communicate social approval for behavior (Goldstein et al, 2007; Kallgren et al, 2000; Schultz et
al, 2007). Influence messages inferred to originate with a target's in-group generally show
effectiveness in predicting target behavior (Ajzen, 1985; Smith & Hogg, 2007), especially when
message content communicates values or attitudes central to a target's definition of group
membership (Wyer, 2010). An individual who identifies closely with their in-group conforms to
the prototypical norms of that group, and this conformity also involves the internalization and
reinforcement of shared attitudes (Smith & Hogg, 2007; van Knippenberg et al, 1994). Also,
individuals who perceive that others in their identity group simultaneously share attention with
them to an issue under consideration may incline toward judgments with extremity on group
lines; this describes one reason why mass communicators, within their persuasive messages,
often address audiences as abstract unified groups (Hogg, 2018; Shteynberg et al, 2016), relying
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on ambiguous statements of unity in lieu of missing evidence of that unity. Groups perceived by
members as more unified tend to yield higher levels of group identification, especially for selfuncertain individuals (Hogg et al, 2007).
Brown et al (2019), in a rare test of situational factors' effects on BSR, found that
individuals whose sense of belongingness was threatened became more open to bullshit
messages. On the other hand, individuals became more inclined toward bullshit detection when
their individual self esteem was threatened. The difference maker may lie in the attitudinal and
behavioral knowledge structures accessed by individuals within those situations. Under
belongingness threat, an individual may strive to access social information, learned from
relational experience, in order to solve the problem by facilitating social connection (Terry &
Hogg, 1996). Under self-esteem threat, and made wary of message content by mood (Forgas,
2019), an individual may rely on personal identity knowledge to evaluate and resolve the
problem. Without an induced need to connect, an individual may feel more motivated to
carefully attend to and reject the bullshit.
At Pennycook et al's (2015) baseline using pseudo-profound items, high BSR individuals
may not merely lack the faculties for breaking messages down, but may also not hold
motivations toward skepticism because they seek quick closure or satisfaction with the content of
the message. Beyond "laziness" as Pennycook & Rand (2018) might suggest, this satisfaction
seeking may come from a need to reduce uncertainty that results in a viewing of the message
agent as potentially like-minded. High BSR individuals may more likely perceive similarity in
others, especially as BSR has shown association with agreeableness (Čavojová et al, 2020), an
individual measure of personality that describes trusting, conformist, compliant behaviors (Brook
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& Mount, 1991; Sukenik et al, 2018). Agreeableness predicts leniency in rating others'
performance (Bernardin et al, 2000), and in the case of BSR, it may predict a general tendency to
assign bullshit the benefit of the doubt. The ambiguity built into bullshit messages may facilitate
this response, and the selective use of group-identity-appropriate words or claims that rest within
the social group's latitude of acceptance may stimulate a target's need to express receptivity,
overclaim for the sake of social connection and cooperation, and reduce any uncertainty
stimulated by surrounding ambiguous situations, threatening information, or an insecure
perception of self.
BSR and Uncertainty Concerning Social Groups. The perception of uncertainty
represents a key variable in understanding individuals' motivations to seek or manage
information, not only within approaches to or judgments concerning initial interactions with
strangers (Berger & Calabrese, 1975), but also in facing environmental complexity and
instability or new and dissonant information (Afifi & Matsunaga, 2008; Brashers, 2001;
Festinger, 1957). According to Uncertainty-Identity Theory (UIT; Hogg, 2000, 2007, 2014),
individuals also respond to uncertainty and seek its reduction by seeking commonality with
others and turning to the knowledge and validation provided by their in-group ties (Hogg, 2007).
Message agents familiar with targets’ group categorizations take advantage of those targets’ need
for belonging by crafting messages that suggest a.) that a threat to certainty exists and b.) that
targets must accept their authority or comply with their requests to resolve it (Hogg, 2018).
Bullshit in particular may present high strategic value because of its ability to provide low-cost
“evidence” for evaluating a message agent (even an outsider) as in-group sympathetic and
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authoritative (Hogg, 2018; Hogg & Giles, 2012; Spicer, 2020). A need for uncertainty reduction
may motivate individuals to evaluate that agent’s messages as meaningful, impressive, or true.
Proposed threats to certainty come from without or within. Individuals experience the
unwelcome emotions elicited by uncertainty when they face threats to feelings of safety or
stability, even the stability of their held values or beliefs (Festinger, 1957), and out-group threat
may especially activate defensive behaviors in favor of an individual’s in-group (Tajfel &
Turner, 1986; Wichman, 2012). An individual, tied to a group, learns to manage uncertainty, not
only reduce it (Brashers, 2001), based on their personal and group motivations, and
communication within groups informs and equips these motivations (Belavadi & Hogg, 2019).
Concerning communication and social influence, researchers have observed that a
group’s prototype, or “official personality” toward which self-uncertain members may aspire
(Hohman et al, 2017), achieves definition and reinforcement through norming communication
that draws the lines of group inclusion and exclusion, ostensibly fulfilling group-level goals of
homeostasis and survival (Hogg, 2018; Hogg & Giles, 2012; Hogg & Reid, 2006). A group
member adopts the goal motivations of the group prototype, and threats to certainty, or the
ability to effectively predict and control achievement of those goals (such as that which would
stem from out-group threat), stimulate a need to shore up lines of group, and by association self,
defense.
In addition to the uncertainty generated from perceived external threat classically
understood as a variable in intergroup communication (Hogg and Giles, 2012), UIT makes clear
predictions about individuals’ self-uncertainty as a predictive factor, which can result from
perceived non-belonging or a requisite enhanced need for belonging (Hogg, 2015). Self-
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uncertainty describes individuals who perceive their self-concepts as less stable than desired or
their group role or attitudinal orientations as tenuous or highly dependent on the influence of
their material or social environment (Hohman et al, 2017). Self-uncertain individuals may prefer
high-entitativity groups because the conformity and closed belief systems enforced via
communication in those groups offer stability and security (Hogg, 2015; Hogg & Gaffney,
2014).
Concerning group-prototype-challenging information, individuals who show a yearning
for quick answers (Kruglanski & Webster, 1994), or who have identified themselves as
belonging to entitative groups (Yang et al, 2020), show greater resistance to counter-attitudinal
message acceptance and avoidance of uncertainty-inducing information. The motivations
associated with membership in entitative groups affect the exchange and interpretation of
meaning within both intra-group and intergroup communication. The social identity family of
theories, including UIT and identity fusion theory (Swann et al, 2012), owe their roots to
experimentation exploring intergroup confrontations, and much research has addressed questions
concerning individuals' attraction to extremist groups or willingness to engage in collective
action, sometimes involving extreme self-sacrifice (Besta et al, 2018).
Social identity cues represent an important factor in influence targets’ judgment of source
credibility. Individuals showing receptivity to bullshit are not as driven by unmotivated
impulsiveness as they are by their prior attitudes and the sources in whom they trust their attitude
reinforcement (Littrell et al, 2022). Social group exemplars offer the restoration of attitude
certainty when an individual feels their faith has lapsed (Clarkson et al, 2017), and in uncertain
spaces, individuals seek out like minds. In communication environments allowing little
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synchronous information exchange, socially identifiable aspects of an individual’s selfpresentations, such as a culturally distinctive name or the display of a religious emblem,
represent the foci of their interaction partner’s attention (Reicher et al, 1995). Online
communication spaces, for example, exemplify such deindividuated environments, in which
interlocutors are restricted in their disclosures by the symbols and mechanisms offered by a
mediating device, such as the emoji options on a social networking website. Communication in
such spaces often restricts individuals to uncomplex displays of social identity aspects, and
individual identity information, barring willfully meaningful disclosures, tends to involve more
gradual transmission. In online spaces, individuals generally report positive evaluations and
favor the communication of interactants who present, clearly, that they share a common social
identity (Carr et al, 2013).
The sharing of any clear social identity at all may engender positive evaluations of a
message agent, as individuals deciding under uncertainty or in impersonal interactions will
gravitate toward message elements that encourage ease of processing (Read, 2020). When
interactants feel depersonalized within their communication environment, encountering an
ingroup member, especially a prototypical one, results in greater adherence to group norms;
contrastwise, conformity is reduced under conditions of personalization (Lee, 2004; Smith &
Hogg, 2008). Conformity to the standards of one’s group, however, does not necessarily mean
mindless behavior as much as attention to the collective aspect of identity (see Brewer &
Gardner, 1996; Reicher et al, 1995), and an individual’s processing and behavioral expression
regarding group normativity may change as their experiences and situational goals shift their
perspective (Hogg & Smith, 2007).
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Trust in an ingroup source is established in an individual's history of self-expansion and
social goal achievement within their group; likewise, lines of prejudice and habituated social
distancing are drawn by the histories associated with particular outgroups, and social identities
can be defined in terms of negative stereotype and antagonistic expression (Gallois, 2018,
Wichman, 2012). Social identity theory classically posits that even seemingly arbitrary group
labeling can become important to group member’s identities, and individuals rely on group
comparisons to develop their understanding of a network’s boundaries and distinctiveness (Tajfel
& Turner, 1986). Outgroup sources may engender highly negative responses from individuals
acting under conditions of depersonalization, especially as they identify highly with their group,
share its goals, and hold attitudes that an outgroup is inferior (Bee & Dalakas, 2015; Ehala et al,
2016). Individuals achieve self-conceptual clarity through their experiences with other group
members and constitutive processes of belonging and validation within their groups (Besta et al,
2018). Highly self-uncertain individuals, expressing that uncertainty as a personality trait,
constantly seek that validation (Hohman & Hogg, 2015). However, individuals may find their
uncertainty reduced via group identification or, in some cases, increased, especially in
circumstances in which their membership and/or prototypicality are threatened by challenging or
inconsistent information (Choi & Hogg, 2020; Hogg & Majahan, 2018).
This project tests the hypothesis that self-uncertainty and group identity salience activates
goal motivations within respondents that motivate them to adhere meaning to bullshit based on
familiar attitude scripts. In a recent test published in an academic poster, BSR showed significant
association with both epistemic (concerning knowledge) and aleatoric (concerning outcome
likelihood) uncertainty (Neybert et al, 2021). Like the self-uncertainty central to UIT, the
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variable of need for cognitive closure (Kruglanski et al, 1993) may yield similar effects and
convergent theoretical predictions. Need for cognitive closure (NFCC) represents a mostly stable
trait describing individuals who feel an immediate need for answers and uncertainty reduction,
desiring predictability and reduced ambiguity in their environments and the behavior of people
around them. Uncertainty salience causes individuals to show higher NFCC, and both variables
appear to directly predict cognition and behaviors that overemphasize group loyalty and stark
social comparison, such as negative attributions about out-groups (Brizi et al, 2016). Concerning
bullshit, a seeming paradox lies here: Self-uncertain and/or high-NFCC message targets may
prefer reduced ambiguity, and bullshit utilizes intentionally ambiguous constructions, but in its
adherence to superficial claims of authority and prototypicality, effective bullshit may select just
the right message elements for ambiguity and specificity both to offer the uncertainty reduction
that uncertain individuals crave. Bullshit used as a low-cost placeholder for real evidence offers
the kind of ambiguity that makes judgment quick and, essentially, intuitive, especially if targets
have access to automatized attitude or knowledge scripts (Carpenter, 2017). Bullshit may exhibit
ambiguous and superficial meaning, but making the decision process simpler allows high-NFCC
(and likely highly self-uncertain) people to quickly reach clarity and closure (CzernatowiczKukuscza et al, 2014).
Summary
This project proposes that receptivity to bullshit pseudo-reasoning has causes that lie
within on-line message processing and rapid conclusions drawn in favor of accessible message
elements (Hastie & Park, 1986; Kruglanski and Thompson, 1999), such as those tied to the
experiences individuals have concerning their group categorizations and feelings of self-
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uncertainty. Most individuals, as inexperienced epistemologists (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999;
Kruglanski & Webster, 1994), may accept bullshit presented as evidence or rationale for
compliance when they feel that those claims fulfill their needs for uncertainty reduction and
requisite belonging to their in-group, especially as their history of communication and meaning
making within their in-groups inform their apprehension of reality (Terry & Hogg, 1996). Under
conditions of emotion-arousing uncertainty, individuals may gravitate toward message elements,
such as source cues of social identity, that present unequivocal evidence toward resolving that
uncertainty. Targets may evaluate the adjoining ambiguous pseudo-reasoning with leniency or
attribute unwarranted meaning to it as targets haphazardly speed up or arrest processing. This
effect should show particular strength when bullshit messages accompany further messaging that
aligns with a target's self-categorization (Hogg, 2007).
When addressing the attribution of meaning to stimuli, scholars should remember that,
according to classical understanding in the communication discipline, meaning exists not in
words or symbolic things, but in people, and proceeds not only from snapshot communication
episodes, but from individuals' history of experiences (Berlo, 1960). The majority of BSR
research has involved the cross-sectional, non-experimental development of scales similar to that
of Pennycook et al (2015) and/or correlational analyses with individual difference variables.
Therefore, this bullshit dissertation calls for more research addressing bullshit production and
receptivity by way of the experimental analysis of communication episodes that involve and
control not only message structure, but source, channel, and environmental elements.
This project features two studies: First, a survey-based test of pseudo-inspirational
bullshit manipulations and group identification in a de-individuated context, and second, a field
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experiment testing subject compliance with pseudo-reasoning-accompanied request messages,
controlling for group categorization and interacting with self-uncertainty. In both studies, a
source seeking attributions of social attractiveness and trustworthiness attempts to garner
message acceptance through the communication of bullshit. As substitutes for specific
information in both studies, the bullshit statements bear the function of attempting to inspire and
mobilize the message target – in other words, acting as "inspirational" bullshit. Before the
experimentation, however, a study partially replicating Pennycook et al (2015) established the
role of self-uncertainty in the interpretation of inspirational bullshit and created induction
material for the experimental designs.

31
Chapter Two: Preliminary Replication Study
Prior to the online experiment, an online survey study tested 16 potential pseudoreasoning inductions in the method devised by Pennycook et al (2015), in which respondents
rated bullshit messages mixed with mundane messages for contrast (4 devised for this study). For
respondents, the study advertising bore the title, “Inspirational Messages and Identity.” The LET
(Kruglanski et al, 2010) predicts that individuals will make judgments about new information in
large part based on the availability of epistemically authoritative resources (i.e. backing) for
those judgments. Self-uncertainty represents a condition for individuals in which they have little
confidence in their self-knowledge, and much of their judgments are reliant upon the knowledge
and attitude structures provided by others, particularly the influential members of their social
groups (Hogg, 2007; Hohman et al, 2017; Swann & Bosson, 2010). Therefore, the preliminary
replication study addressed the following hypothesis.
H1: Self-uncertainty positively predicts receptivity to (a) pseudo-profound and (b)
inspirational bullshit.
Participants
An initial sample of 250 respondents was recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(mTurk) subject pool. Each individual who completed the survey after having given informed
consent was paid $1. During data cleaning, 16 respondents were removed for suspect response
behaviors, such as artificial intelligence checks. The ultimate sample for analysis retained 223
subjects.
Of the respondents, 61% identified as male, 38.1% identified as female, and 1%
identified as nonbinary or third gender. Regarding ethnicity, the sample identified as 79.8%
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White, 9.9% Black or African-American, 7.6% Asian, 0.9% American Indian or Alaska Native,
and 1.9% as “other.” Participants’ ages ranged from 23-73, with 36.6 marking the mean age.
For the sake of developing inductions for further study, a small-sample pilot test yielded
results on which “inspirational bullshit” message was suitable for use as a pseudo-reasoning
bullshit induction, and this result was employed for experimentation immediately. To aid in
qualifying the pilot’s result, a parallel sample of 50 mTurk respondents was added to the
preliminary study and given an alternative “inspirational bullshit” questionnaire in which they
rated the ambiguity of the statements. Of these 50 respondents, 1 was removed for incomplete
responses, leaving 49 for the parallel analysis.
Procedure and Measures
Participants provided consent and were directed to report on scale measures via the
Qualtrics online survey platform, on which responses were kept anonymous. Barring
demographic items, all measures were adapted to fit a 7-point Likert-type structure for
questionnaires.
Measurements
Pseudo-Profound Bullshit (PPBSR). This study employed the 10 highest-mean-scoring
items from Pennycook et al’s (2015) original studies measuring, ostensibly as an individual
difference variable, the tendency of individuals to derive meaning from supposedly meaningless
messages. Each item is followed by a Likert scale measuring the degree to which respondents
found the statement “profound.” The scale included items such as "Consciousness is the growth
of coherence, and of us," and "Nature is a self-regulating ecosystem of awareness."
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Inspirational Bullshit (IBSR). Similar to Jurkovič et al's (2018; Čavojová et al, 2020)
instrument development for a general BSR scale and Gligoric et al’s (2020) development of a
political BSR scale, the author infused a particular message structure – in this case a “call to
action” message – with various buzzwords and abstractions taken from and inspired by
“inspirational” quotes in books of historical quotations (e.g. collocations with numerous potential
interpretations, such as "Giving someone a hand up creates a blossoming of karmic glory").
Keeping within the pragmatic realm of putting on airs of authority or certainty, all bullshit
messages represented declarative statements about supposed truths, just as in Pennycook et al
(2015). Specific items, such as "A charitable heart plants the seeds of progress," which the pilot
study results deemed the most appropriate induction message, can be found in Appendix A.
Self-Uncertainty. Self-uncertainty refers to an individual’s lack of self-conceptual
clarity, especially regarding their own self-definition, feeling of stability as an individual, and/or
standing within a social group (Hogg, 2007). This study adapts 12 items from previous
measurements of the construct within group identification research (Hohman et al, 2017),
including items such as "I think I know other people better than I know myself" and "If I were
asked to describe my personality, my description might be different from one day to the other."
Auxiliary Measures
Three further constructs, apart from those involved in the hypothesis, were added to the
survey for the sake of potential secondary analysis. Agreeableness represents one of the Big 5
Inventory of personality variables (Barrick & Mount, 1991), defining a trait-like tendency to
cooperate, acquiesce, perceive similarity, and show leniency in interactions. This measurement
employed the HEXACO-60 (Ashton & Lee, 2009) 10-item scale of the Big Five personality
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traits, which analyzes the agreeableness construct along construct “facets” of forgiveness,
gentleness, flexibility, and patience, including items such as "I tend to be lenient in judging other
people" and "Most people tend to get angry more quickly than I do."
NFCC refers to an individual’s need for stability, reduction of ambiguity, and feeling of
control and accuracy in judgment, especially in suddenly uncertain situations (Kruglanski et al,
1993). A 15-item form of the NFCC scale was adapted from (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011) with the
scale treated as a unidimensional measure, as had been done in previous research (Roets & Van
Hiel, 2007). Respondents marked their level of agreement on items such as "I don't like to go
into a situation without knowing what I expect from it" and "I don't like to be with people who
are capable of unexpected actions."
Finally, 15 items from Brotherton et al’s (2013) conspiracy belief scale assessed
individuals’ generalized acceptance of popular conspiracy theories regarding far-reaching
national and social catastrophes. Items featured Likert-type measurements of agreement with
statements such as “The government uses some people as patsies to hide its involvement in
criminal activity.”
Results
Measurement Models
Before hypothesis testing, the measurement model for each of the five measures was
subjected to confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). The CFA method calculated factor loadings
with a centroid estimation procedure using communalities on the diagonal. Factor loadings and
model specifications were used to generate a predicted inter-item correlation matrix, which was
then subtracted from the observed inter-item correlation matrix, producing a residual matrix for
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the assessment of model fit. To the extent that the residuals in the matrix were within sampling
error of zero, it was concluded the model exhibited fit with the data. This process uncovered
misfit on some items, which were removed from the analysis.
The CFA for inspirational bullshit receptivity (IBSR) yielded eight items (factor loadings
M = 0.73, s = 0.08) in a unidimensional model showing consistency with the data, with RMSEA
= .02, GFI = .98, χ 2 (20) = 21.12, ns. For pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity (PPBSR), the
CFA yielded six items (factor loadings M = 0.76, s = 0.07) in a unidimensional model showing
consistency with the data, with RMSEA = .05, GFI = .98, χ 2 (9) = 13.88, ns. The CFA for selfuncertainty (SU) yielded five items (factor loadings M = 0.89, s = 0.02) in a unidimensional
model showing consistency with the data, with RMSEA < .001, GFI = .99, χ 2 (5) = 2.42, n.s.
The full model testing parallelism between all three constructs showed consistency with the data,
with RMSEA = .04, GFI = .91, χ 2 (149) = 219.21, p < .001.
In consideration of the discriminant and concurrent validity of the PPBSR and IBSR
measures, both measures were subject to separate CFAs analyzing a two-construct model and a
single-construct model. The two-construct model showed reasonable fit, with RMSEA = .04, GFI
= .93, χ 2 (134) = 175.51, p = .01. The single-construct model showed poorer fit, with RMSEA =
.09, GFI = .79, χ 2 (135) = 381.42, p < .001. The superior fit of the two-construct model suggests
PPBSR and IBSR measure separate constructs.
However, PPBSR and IBSR are highly correlated, as is evident in Table 1, featuring the
study's correlation matrix between measured variables (R = .75). This ample correlation fits the
pattern of concurrence claimed by other scale-development tests of BSR along different domains
(Evans et al, 2020).
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Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations on levels of inspirationality (n = 234)
and ambiguity (n = 49) measured for the preliminary study. Two items (Nos. 5 and 12) failed to
show sufficient levels of inspirationality in comparison to the "mundane" items and were
removed. A t-test compared the composite of the 14 remaining items to the four intentionally less
inspirational "mundane" items, finding that the difference was significant, t(233) = 9.00, p <
.001. Similarly, the parallel sample of 49 respondents reported significantly greater levels of
ambiguity for the first 16 items in comparison to the "mundane" four, with t(48) = 3.98, p < .001.
Tables 3-5 show scale item data post-CFA.
Hypothesis Testing
H1 predicted a positive effect of self-uncertainty on (a) inspirational bullshit receptivity
and (b) pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity. A test of linear regression found that selfuncertainty’s effect on PPBSR (R = .47) was slightly more robust and significant, with t(232) =
8.12, b = .36, p < .001. Self-uncertainty's effect on IBSR (R = .38) was slightly less robust, but
significant, with t(232) = 6.20, b = .23, p < .001. H1 was fully supported.
Discussion
Individuals experiencing little certainty regarding their perceptions of self may feel a
persistent compulsion to adopt or perform allegiance to the attitudes of others, particularly those
who belong to their in-group, and/or those who display greater comparative attitudinal certainty
(Hogg & Giles, 2012). In the framework of LET, this phenomenon reflects individuals' need to
make sense of their experiences via relationships with (and trust in) sources of epistemic
authority (Kruglanski et al, 2010; Kruglanski & Webster, 1994). From the perspective of UIT,
the promise of reduced uncertainty via turning to normed epistemic authority may represent one
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of many group phenomena that potentially lead self-uncertain individuals to seek answers from
their prototypical group leadership or knowledge structures (Hogg, 2007).
Therefore, the first hypothesis for this dissertation suggested that individuals would show
greater pseudo-profound and inspirational BSR when their self-uncertainty motivated them to
seek urgent answers from familiar knowledge sources. In on-line processing, subjects may make
positive judgments about ambiguous pseudo-reasoning without the reflective time necessary for
more critical evaluations. The results of the survey and testing supported the hypothesis, though
a stronger relationship appeared between self-uncertainty and pseudo-profound BSR over
inspirational BSR.
Source cues are particularly important for the judgment processes of self-uncertain
individuals (Swann & Bosson, 2010). Within this study, both pseudo-profound bullshit and
inspirational bullshit are lacking in such cues beyond what may be inferred from the words
chosen and the research purposes of the survey (i.e. an academic source). Inspirational message
content may differ from the pseudo-profound regarding respondents' familiarity with
inspirational collocations over the lofty metaphysics involved in Pennycook et al's (2015) items.
Self-uncertain subjects who lack confidence in their own interpretation abilities may have felt
more intimidated by the degree of "obscurantism" (Cohen, 2002) apparent in statements such as
"consciousness is the growth of coherence."
Based on the inspirational bullshit ambiguity analysis and T-tests, it was determined that
the designed inspirational bullshit items represented appropriate indicators for judging
inspirationality, and their significant ambiguity represented, conceptually, evidence that they
would function as appropriate inductions for an experiment controlling the ambiguous pseudo-
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reasoning quality of influence messages. Between inspirationality and ambiguity, the message
"A charitable heart plants the seeds of progress" scored the highest, therefore the later
experimental inductions employed it in their design.
Limitations
Mainly, and informing the purpose of the experimental studies, the preliminary
replication study was limited by its use of BSR scales, which represent series of statements
assessed by subjects via underdefined single-item evaluations. Furthermore, an induction check
showed that the chosen scale items represented inspirational and ambiguous qualities
significantly different from “mundane items,” but only four of those items were used, and they
potentially offered insufficient, ill-defined contrast. In Pennycook et al’s (2015) scale
development, several of their contrast items also received high scores on profundity. This calls
into question whether individuals responding to the scales were effectively judging message
qualities or acquiescing to the authoritative requests of the researchers. Evans et al (2020)
addressed this problem in developing their scientific BSR instrument, but it remains to be seen if,
as in the science domain, knowledge of science or faith in science represent constructs conflated
with scientific BSR. If BSR scales measure an authentic construct describing interpretation
processes, they need to undergo further processes of validation (Levine, 2005).
As this study was conducted with a sample from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mTurk),
some potential sample error should be considered. While mTurk ostensibly offers researchers a
more diverse base of respondents than most college student samples in the Uunited States,
mTurk workers are also more likely to have over-exposed themselves to socio-psychological
experimental paradigms, potentially rendering themselves less-immersed or negativized subjects
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(Rand et al, 2014). Furthermore, as online labor is more easily outsourced to artificial
intelligence, the danger of artificial intelligence entering researchers’ samples continues to
increase.
This study was also administered under the socio-historical effects of the COVID-19
pandemic, which should be considered as a potential moderator in any meta-analysis of social
research. In mTurk’s case, more individuals have been attracted to the platform’s minor income
supplementation as the pandemic has thrown economies into flux (Lourenco & Tasimi, 2020). In
future studies using the platform, it may be prudent to measure respondents’ socio-economic
status or related variables.
Future Research
If individuals are predisposed toward pseudo-profound and inspirational BSR because
they feel little clarity of self, and their low clarity of self causes them to lack confidence in their
own judgment skills, then they may more likely seek clarity from an external epistemic authority.
On one hand, this may tie LET and its related constructs, such as need for cognitive closure, to
BSR and potentially other markers of susceptibility to bad faith persuasion or deception. On
another hand, self-uncertainty’s relationship to social identity and the performance of adherence
to social group prototypes may suggest source and receiver identity factors may be relevant to
predicting BSR.
The purpose of this preliminary replication study was not to create a new BSR scale for
treatment of the construct as an individual difference variable. Instead, this study sought to create
inductions for use in experimentation with “bullshit” conceptualized as a type of pseudoreasoning used to accompany claims or requests. Pennycook and colleagues’ (2015) scale
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represented a study of message acceptance using single-item assessments of individual
statements, which represents a drastically underdefined way to gauge message evaluation and/or
interpretation. Furthermore, the use and interpretation of different devices in message craft is
best understood when communication can be coordinated within purposeful interactions
(Burleson, 2010, Liao et al, 2021). Meaning is not found solely in words, but in people (Berlo,
1960). Therefore, the items created for the inspirational BSR scale were submitted to pilot testing
with small samples who evaluated them on both their “inspirationality,” or ability to motivate
individuals to act prosocially, and “ambiguity,” or potential for being interpreted in numerous
ways. The statement rated as highest combining both criteria – “A charitable heart plants the
seeds of progress” – was slated for use in the planning of experimental tests of pseudo-reasoning
bullshit.
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Chapter Three: Online Experiment
The first experiment involved an online survey with inductions varying source in-group
cues and message reasoning type while eliciting responses to mobilizing inspirational messages.
Respondents evaluated a message source's social attractiveness and trustworthiness, the
message’s believability, and their acceptance of the message. Subjects also reported on selfuncertainty and other measures relevant to potential secondary analysis. The study was designed
according to a 3 x 3 factorial on levels of the message source displaying group-identifiable-vscontrol cues and mobilizing messages accompanying either specific reasoning or ambiguous
pseudo-reasoning. The online experiment addressed the hypotheses below.
Individuals motivated by group identification and self-uncertainty to perform solidarity
by positively evaluating messages from a seemingly group-affiliated source (Hogg, 2007; 2018)
may latch onto message elements (e.g. source information) showing evidence of that group
affiliation, especially within a communication environment containing scarce personally
identifying information (Carr et al, 2013). For religious categorization, the religious context of
message judgment alone may drive message acceptance, as per Gueguen et al’s (2015)
interpretation of individuals’ receptivity to Christian iconography in their study, which
associated Christian affiliation with messaging about prosocial action. For this study, individuals
perceiving religious identity information in the message agent were expected to access
knowledge related to their own (non)religious beliefs and histories in order to evaluate
persuasive messages. The ambiguity of pseudo-reasoning in the messages was hypothesized to
facilitate this. However, to account for potential error related to the complexity of judgments of
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religious categorizations and the contexts they imply, a level was added to the inductions
presenting social identity cues related to affinity with a particular sport.
H2: (a) Source cues identifying the source as sharing the target's social categorization
positively predict message acceptance in comparison to the control. A positive
relationship with (b) the social identifiability, i.e. social attractiveness and
trustworthiness, of the source, in sequence with (c) evaluation of message
believability, mediates the aforementioned source cue effect.
Considering bullshit pseudo-reasoning as a substitute for specific information, if
ambiguous messages, sounding like reasoning, behave similarly to placebic information (Langer
et al, 1978), then pseudo-reasoning messages should not differ in effect from specific reasoning.
H3: Pseudo-reasoning messages do not differ significantly from reasoning in their
positive prediction of message acceptance in comparison to a control.
The combination of distinctive source cues with ambiguous pseudo-reasoning message
content should also bias targets in favor of those distinctive cue evidences, resulting in greater
positive attributions of source and message and leading to greater message acceptance (Erb et al,
2007).
H4: (a) Distinctive social identity source cues and pseudo-reasoning messages interact to
produce effects on message acceptance greater than those in groups lacking either
induction. A positive relationship with (b) the social attractiveness and
trustworthiness of the source, in sequence with (c) evaluation of message
believability, mediates the aforementioned interaction effect.

43
Self-uncertainty leads to individuals persistently performing allegiance to the group
affiliations that offer relief for that uncertainty (Hogg, 2007). Exposed to a combination of
ambiguous information and ingroup source cues, highly self-uncertain individuals may rapidly
evaluate such ambiguous pseudo-reasoning messages. This study will analyze the effect of selfuncertainty on message acceptance for those inductions.
H5: (a) Self-uncertainty positively predicts acceptance of messages combining social
identity source cues and pseudo-reasoning inspirational statements. (b) Selfuncertainty positively moderates the relationship between social
attractiveness/trustworthiness of the source and message believability that mediate
the aforementioned relationship.
Figure 1 shows the proposed model of relationship between variables.
Participants
Communication students from a large university in the Southern United States were
recruited and incentivized via academic credit to participate in the survey-based experiment, and
382 respondents were initially enrolled in the study. Data cleaning removed incomplete and
suspect responses (e.g. with low survey completion times), and 32 responses were removed,
resulting in 350 retained for the analysis. Advertising for the study displayed the title "An
Evaluation of Calls to Action from Peers."
In order to add a layer to perceived distinctiveness from other respondents, instructions
and opening material informed participants from the outset that students from other universities
would also participate. The study admitted only respondents over the age of 18, and all
participants provided informed consent before beginning the survey.
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Figure 1. Processing Sequence of Messages Varying on Reasoning and Social Identity Cue.
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Participants' ages ranged from 18-30, with 19 the median age. White individuals
constituted 90% of the sample, with a further 3.1% identifying as Black or African American,
0.3% identifying as American Indian or Alaska Native, 3.7% identifying as Asian, and 2.9%
identifying as "Other." Females constituted 62.6% of the sample, with 36.3% identifying as male
and 1.2% identifying as nonbinary or otherwise. Regarding social categorizations relevant to the
experimental conditions, in terms of religion, 73.1% of respondents identified as Christian and
20.9% identified as non-religious; 41.1% identified themselves as football fans over other sports.
Procedure
The online survey featured an experimental test manipulating source cues and message
ambiguity. After completing standard demographic items, respondents answered a question
asking them to name the (non)religious categorization to which they belonged followed by a
Likert-type item measuring the extent to which they affiliate with that particular (non)religious
categorization (i.e. “How close do you feel you are with people who share your religious beliefs?
Not very close – Very close”). In addition to the religious categorization questions, respondents
answered similar items involving their categorization and identification with a particular school
and sports affinity.
Following initial categorization questions, for the purpose of experimental immersion, the
instructions informed participants that other individuals from other universities had completed
some of the questions they would encounter, and they would see some of their answers. After a
prompt, respondents wrote in what they would consider a "catch phrase" that they liked, or an
"inspiring statement." Then, after another prompt, respondents wrote a "call to action" for their
peers, described as follows: "Now, we would like you to write a message to your peers (two
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sentences) about something you think everyone should do, like a 'call to action.' What is
something you think your peers would benefit from doing?" Respondents also chose a graphic
avatar to accompany the messages they wrote before choosing whether they would allow other
study respondents to potentially see their choices. Graphic avatars featured options with common
religious iconography, including the Christian cross. Appendix B contains all graphic elements
and induction details.
After subjects completed their own messages, the survey platform randomly assigned
participants into experimental condition groups, organized in a 3 x 3 factorial design. Depending
on the condition group, respondents encountered a graphic, catch phrase/inspiring statement, and
"call to action" labeled as "chosen and written by another respondent earlier in the study," each
adhering to a particular group induction or control. All induction groups featured the same
baseline "call to action" statement: "I think everyone should help the homeless more often." No
reasoning for the assertion was presented. In the control group, the information presented a
generic avatar (an image of the planet Earth) and catch phrase ("You do you!").
For the religious identity cue induction, the page displayed a Christian cross avatar and a
religious catchphrase (“Jesus is the answer!”). For the sports identity cue induction, the page
displayed an image of a football and a related catchphrase (“Football is life”). For the message
reasoning inductions, specific reasoning involved adding the following sentence to the baseline:
“Giving to shelters means rehab and resources to help them rejoin and give back to society.”
Pseudo-reasoning involved use of the induction choice from the preliminary study: “giving to
shelters shows a charitable heart, which plants the seeds of progress.”
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After exposure to these inductions, respondents in all groups proceeded along the same
procedural route. Following their reading of "other participants'" work (examples in Appendix
B), respondents answered whether they wanted to revise the information they chose and wrote
for the avatar, catch phrase, and “call-to-action” questions. Afterward, they completed
questionnaires on the social identifiability/attractiveness of the individual whose information
they viewed, as well as a scale measuring their perception of that person's trustworthiness. Then,
respondents judged the believability of the statements the individual made before completing a
measure of message acceptance.
Finally, respondents completed a measurement of self-uncertainty. Then, for the purposes
of potential secondary analysis, they completed questionnaires on agreeableness, need for
cognitive closure, group identification, identity fusion, and conspiracist belief.
Measures
Inductions and Measurements
“Inspirational” Pseudo-Reasoning Induction. A small sample pilot evaluated items
from the inspirational BSR scale in the preliminary study according to their inspirational nature
and ambiguity. “A charitable heart plants the seeds of progress” yielded the most positive results
aligning both criteria. Appendix A contains specific items for all instruments involved in this
dissertation.
Social attractiveness and trustworthiness. A 13-item 7-point Likert scale developed by
McCroskey et al (2006) with one addition measured respondents' considerations of message
agents' social attractiveness, analyzing the likeability of the request message's source, its items
representing potential usefulness as an indicator of the potential relationship struck within a
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bullshit message exchange. McCroskey & Teven's (1999) scale measuring the trustworthiness
dimension of credibility was also used to measure positively valenced source judgments.
Message Believability. Message believability's measurement employed six semantic
differential scale items from McCroskey & Teven (1999), including a choice between "Agree"
and "Disagree" concerning the message.
Message Acceptance. Message acceptance's measurement used a combination of nine
items from Zhao et al's (2011) measure of argument strength and LaFrance & Boster's (2001)
argument quality scale, tailored to fit the types of messages used in the experiment.
Self-Uncertainty. Self-uncertainty refers to an individual’s lack of self-conceptual
clarity, especially regarding their own self-definition, feeling of stability as an individual, and/or
standing within a social group (Hogg, 2007). This study adapts 12 items from previous
measurements of the construct within UIT research (Hohman et al, 2017; Hohman & Hogg,
2015).
Auxiliary Measures
Parallel to the preliminary study, the online experiment also elicited responses for the
need for cognitive closure and agreeableness scales, in addition to the following two instruments,
for the purpose of potential secondary analysis.
Group Identification. Group identification measures the extent to which an individual
seeks to adhere to the goals, traits, or attitudes of their group’s prototypes, or the “official
personality” of the group as defined through norming communication (Hogg & Giles, 2012;
Tajfel & Turner, 1986). This measure, adapted from (Hogg & Hains, 1998), employs 10 items.
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Identity Fusion. Identity fusion represents the extent to which an individual has
internalized their affiliation with a group and made that affiliation a stable part of their selfconcept (Swann et al, 2012). Identity fusion represents a separate construct from group
identification, which concerns individual adherence to group prototypical norms and relational
ties, but as a construct developed through similar experiences of self-expansion with group
members, it represents a reliable correlate with group identification.
Results
Measurement Models
Before hypothesis testing, each of the five relevant continuous variables’ measurement
models was subjected to confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using SPSS AMOS. The CFA
calculated factor loadings with a centroid estimation procedure using communalities on the
diagonal. Factor loadings and model specifications contributed to the generation of a predicted
inter-item correlation matrix, which was then subtracted from the observed inter-item correlation
matrix, producing a residual matrix for the assessment of model fit. To the extent that the item
residuals were within sampling error of zero, the model showed fit with the data. Items showing
especial misfit were removed from the analysis.
The CFA for social attractiveness yielded five items (factor loadings M = 0.69, s = 0.15)
in a unidimensional model showing moderate consistency with the data, with RMSEA = .07, GFI
= .99, χ 2 (2) = 5.12, ns. For trustworthiness, the CFA yielded four items (factor
loadings M = 0.76, s = 0.06) in a unidimensional model showing consistency with the data, with
RMSEA = .04, GFI = .99, χ 2 (2) = 3.31, ns. The CFA for believability yielded four items (factor
loadings M = 0.91, s = 0.03) in a unidimensional model showing consistency with the data, with
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RMSEA = .05, GFI = .99, χ 2 (2) = 4.07, ns. The CFA for message acceptance yielded five items
(factor loadings M = 0.77, s = 0.09) in a unidimensional model showing consistency with the
data, with RMSEA = .02, GFI = .99, χ 2 (5) = 5.87, ns. The CFA for self-uncertainty yielded 10
items (factor loadings M = 0.59, s = 0.20) in a unidimensional model showing consistency with
the data, with RMSEA = .03, GFI = .97, χ 2 (35) = 45.73, ns. The CFA for the total complex
model including all five constructs, showed reasonable fit, yielding indices of RMSEA = .04,
GFI = .91, χ 2 (314) = 461.44, p < .001. Table 6 presents the variable correlation matrix. Tables
7-11 present the scale item data.
Hypothesis Testing
H2 hypothesized that social identity cues accompanying messages would positively
predict message acceptance in comparison to the control, in particular for respondents selfcategorizing with the presented social identity group. H3 hypothesized that both specific
reasoning messages and ambiguous pseudo-reasoning messages would predict positive effects on
message acceptance that differ non-significantly from each other. To test these hypotheses the
data was first tested via a two-way ANOVA without considering respondents' religious or sportsrelated identities. Table 12 presents the cell means.
The ANOVA resulted in a non-significant effect shown between the categorical variables
and message acceptance, with the model presenting F(8,341) = 1.45, p = .18. No significant
difference between condition groups was found, and H2 and H3 could not be supported. Lacking
a significant direct effect, no mediation from source judgment or message believability could be
inferred, thus eliminating the utility of path analysis for the proposed model. The test showed no
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significant interaction effect between the categorical variables, further eliminating support for
H4.
To further unpack the effects, despite non-significance, categorical message type and
identity group variables were dummy coded for simple effects with the control groups as
referent, and correlation coefficients were calculated by way of linear regression for all
continuous variables in the model. Table 13 presents the effects, showing significance in line
with the hypotheses presented only for the main effect of reasoning type on trustworthiness – for
reasoning, R = .20, b = .45, F(1, 235) = 10.05, p = .002; for ambiguous pseudo-reasoning, R =
.18, b = .38, F(1,230) = 7.40, p = .01 – and significance opposite the hypothesized direction for
the main effect of identity cue on social attractiveness and trustworthiness – for sports, nearidentical effects on both variables: social attractiveness, R = -.18, , b = -.30, F(1, 230) = 7.95, p =
.01; trustworthiness, R = -.18, b = -.37, F(1,230) = 7.45, p = .01 – and believability for religious
identity, R = -.18, , b = -.43, F(1,233) = 7.40, p = .01. Message reasoning type effects on
believability, though non-significant, showed respondents considering both specific reasoning
and ambiguous pseudo-reasoning as eliciting a negative judgment.
Considering the significant regression effects on trustworthiness, a two-way ANOVA
tested categorical between-group differences on trustworthiness. The test showed significant
differences, presenting F(8,341) = 3.37, p = .001. No interaction effect was detected between
message reasoning and identity cues, but message reasoning presented significant main effect
differences (p = .002), as did identity cue (p = .01). For message reasoning, specific reasoning
differed significantly from the control (p = .003), as did ambiguous pseudo-reasoning (p = .02),
but they did not differ significantly from each other. For identity cues, the sports identity differed
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significantly (and negatively) from the control group (p = .02) and the religious identity (p =
.03). Table 14 presents the cell means for trustworthiness. Figure 2 presents the differences in
effect on trustworthiness for the categorical variables.
H4 hypothesized that self-uncertainty would positively moderate the acceptance of
messages combining ingroup source cues and ambiguous inspirational pseudo-reasoning. Selfuncertainty was added as a predictor to the categorical variables in a three-way ANCOVA,
detecting a significant interaction effect with identity cue inductions, with F(2,341) = 4.41, p =
.01. Using regression to unpack specific interactions, tests of multiple linear regression with
dummy coded message type yielded a significant interaction effect of self-uncertainty and
religious (Christian) identity cues on message acceptance, with b = -.43, t(233) = -3.17, p = .002.
At one standard deviation below the mean of self-uncertainty, the effect of religious identity cues
on message acceptance was significant, though negative (b = -.61, p = .004). At mean selfuncertainty, the effect diminished and lost significance (b = -.23, p = .12). At one standard
deviation above the mean for self-uncertainty, the effect became positive, though non-significant
(b = .32, p = .11). While this presented self-uncertainty as moderating the effect of religious
identity cues, a combined effect with message reasoning in the predicted direction was not found,
therefore H4 could not be supported.
Considering that message reasoning types showed significant effects on trustworthiness
and identity cues showed significant effects on social attractiveness in prior analyses, selfuncertainty was entered into ANCOVA and tests of multiple linear regression with dummy
coded message types on those outcome variables. The three-way ANCOVA revealed a
significant interaction between self-uncertainty and identity cues, with F(2,332) = 6.62, p = .002.
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Concerning social attractiveness, a significant interaction effect of self-uncertainty and
religious (Christian) identity cues was found, b = -.37, t(233) = -3.33, p = .001. At one standard
deviation below the mean of self-uncertainty, the effect of religious identity cues on social
attractiveness was significant, though negative (b = -.66, p < .001). At mean self-uncertainty, the
effect diminished and remained significant (b = -.26, p = .03). At one standard deviation above
the mean for self-uncertainty, the effect became positive, though non-significant (b = .14, p =
.40). No other interactions with self-uncertainty yielded significant effects on social
attractiveness or the other outcome variables.
The prior tests were repeated twice, first limiting the sample to the selection of
individuals who reported identification with the Christian social identity presented in the
inductions (n = 256), and then the individuals who categorized themselves as football fans (n =
144). A significant main effect of message reasoning was found for the trustworthiness outcome
variable, however.
Controlling for religious categorization, the ANOVA testing categorical variable effects
on message acceptance detected no significant differences, with F(8,247) = 1.20, p = .30. On
trustworthiness, the ANOVA detected significant differences, with F(8,247) = 3.37, p = .001. No
interaction effect was detected between message reasoning and identity cue inductions. Both
specific reasoning (p = .01) and pseudo-reasoning (p = .05) differed significantly from the
control, but not from each other. Regarding identity cues, the sports identity differed
significantly from the religious identity (p = .003), but not from the control. Table 15 shows the
cell means.
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Testing the effects of self-uncertainty, a three-way ANCOVA with message acceptance
as the dependent variable showed no significant between-group differences, with F(17,238) =
1.07, p = .38. In the Christian sample, self-uncertainty yielded no other significant effects on the
relationship between the inductions and message acceptance.
Controlling for the football fan categorization, the ANOVA testing categorical variable
effects on message acceptance detected no significant differences, with F(8,135) = 1.59, p = .14.
Table 16 shows the cell means. However, the model failed Levene's test of homogeneity of
variance (p = .02). Therefore, each main effect was tested again via one-way ANOVA with a
Welch-Satterthwaite adjustment. Only message reasoning presented a significant main effect on
message acceptance, with F(2,141) = 3.18, p = .05. In this case, only specific reasoning showed
significant difference from the control (p = .05), but no significant difference from the pseudoreasoning condition. The main effect of identity cues was non-significant.
On trustworthiness while controlling for the football fan categorization, the ANOVA
detected significant differences, with F(8,135) = 2.62, p = .01. No interaction effect was detected
between message reasoning and identity cue inductions. Pseudo-reasoning alone (M = 5.66, p =
.05) differed significantly from the control(M = 5.20). Regarding identity cues, the sports identity
(M = 5.14) differed significantly from the religious identity (M = 5.69, p = .04), but not from the
control (M = 5.64).
Controlling for football fans, testing the effects of self-uncertainty, a three-way
ANCOVA with message acceptance as the dependent variable showed significant between-group
differences, with F(17,126) = 1.86, p = .03. The test detected a significant interaction effect
between self-uncertainty and the identity cue effects, with F(2,126) = 6.14, p = .003. Using
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regression to unpack specific interactions, tests of multiple linear regression with dummy coded
message type yielded a significant interaction effect of self-uncertainty and sports (football fan)
identity cues on message acceptance (b = -.45, p = .01). At one standard deviation below the
mean of self-uncertainty, the effect of sports identity cues on message acceptance was
significant, though negative (b = -.68, p = .02). At mean self-uncertainty, the effect diminished
and lost significance (b = -.20, p = .33). At one standard deviation above the mean for selfuncertainty, the effect became positive, though non-significant (b = .28, p = .30). While this
presented self-uncertainty as moderating the effect of sports identity cues, a combined effect with
message reasoning in the predicted direction was not found, therefore H4 could not be supported.
Discussion
This study proposed that individuals confronted with a claim supported by ambiguous
pseudo-reasoning would respond with little difference from those responding to the same claim
with more specific reasoning. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that social identity cues
matching respondents' self-categorizations would yield higher scores on source and message
evaluations. It was expected that reasoning types and identity cues would interact to predict
source and message evaluations. Some patterns emerged in line with the hypotheses, but in light
of ANOVA results, none of the hypotheses could be fully supported. Social identity cues and
self-uncertainty also yielded some unexpected directions of effect.
Concerning the variable of trustworthiness, both message reasoning conditions differed
significantly from the control and non-significantly from each other, in line with the pattern
suggested by H2. This pattern held when also controlling for religious or sports-related identity
categorizations. Social identity cues, however, did not yield expected effects. Controlling for
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Christian respondents, no significant differences were uncovered. Controlling for selfcategorized football fans, a significant difference was found for the football identity cue, but in a
negative direction in comparison to the control and religious categorizations. The selfuncertainty of subjects, however, predicted a lower likelihood of negative evaluations of
supposed in-group peers. Still, self-uncertainty showed a general negative association with
source and message judgments.
The linearly independent effects of specific reasoning and ambiguous pseudo-reasoning
are consistent with both mindlessness research and the unimodel (Langer et al, 1978; Kruglanski
& Thompson, 1999; Kruglanski et al, 2010). Similar to placebic information, ambiguous pseudoreasoning appears to register in the evaluations of individuals who are making decisions about
communication under some level of uncertainty or obstacles to processing. Regarding an
understanding of message processing from the unimodel perspective, it also fits that reasons of
unequal quality but congruent function (i.e. explaining why helping the homeless is good) would
yield near-equivalent responses from individuals feeling little involvement in the topic.
However, for the online experiment, message reasoning only significantly affected
trustworthiness, suggesting that the effects in this case were made distinctive in interpretation
only on lines of respondents' making judgments about the source. The presentation of evidence,
regardless of quality, affected stronger impressions of honesty but did not appear to alter the
variance in other aspects of evaluation.
Inconsistent with patterns from unimodel research such as Erb et al (2007), the presence
of social identity cues did not engender consistent effects presenting them as clear information to
which subjects could gravitate. The cues did not lend the kind of unequivocal informational
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support necessary for respondents to reach the expected conclusion (i.e. higher message
acceptance). This can be explained in part by some limitations to the experimental design,
addressed below. Apart from sampling, design, and measurement error, however, it is relevant to
consider that not all social identities, and the identification individuals feel with them, are
equivalent in nature, nor are the effects of greater social environments surrounding particular
social groups.
To explain this consideration, it is prudent to similarly consider the fifth hypothesis. H5
hypothesized that self-uncertainty would present a positive moderating effect of message type on
source and message evaluations. The results showed not what was hypothesized per se, but
instead an effect on how harshly negative evaluations were assigned for particular identity
groups. For messages accompanied by football fan identity cues, respondents were largely
negative in their evaluations, though the inclusion of reasoning of any kind improved their
judgments. Concerning independently linear effects, self-uncertainty interacted with the football
fan identity cue to predict football fan subjects' perceptions of social attractiveness and message
acceptance; as self-uncertainty was higher, judgments became generally less negative. A similar
phenomenon was observed for Christian subjects evaluating messages with accompanying
Christian elements.
Self-uncertainty may have differing effects on behavior according to three potential
factors not considered in this experiment: (a) the relevance of the message to group membership,
(b) the effect group membership has on self-uncertainty within an individual's personal history,
and (c) the entitativity of the group (Choi & Hogg, 2020; Hohman et al, 2017). For the sake of
resisting survey fatigue and maintaining the subtlety of the inductions, group salience for
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respondents was not assertively primed – respondents were asked for their categorizations and
then questioned regarding their emotional closeness with their group. Furthermore, the baseline
claims in the inductions represented a topic ostensibly separate from religious or sports group
considerations. Social identity normally needs to be primed as salient for individuals to activate
the related motivating pressures on behavior (Haslam et al, 1999), though, theoretically, the
effects of social identity are omnipresent and especially noticeable when individuals must make
decisions under uncertainty (Schultz et al, 2008) or within de-individuated environments, such as
online spaces (Carr et al, 2013).
Limitations
Several limitations may present explanations for the online experiment results, in which
some hypothesized mean differences appeared, but without statistical significance. The dividing
of the sample into a 9-group design and further controlling for self-categorization likely resulted
in uneven groups with sample sizes that failed to achieve sufficient power to accurately judge the
effects and avoid Type II error (Morrison et al, 2010).
Though pair-wise dummy-coded comparisons showed a significant effect of bullshit
pseudo-reasoning on trustworthiness, subjects may have been responding primarily to message
length and complexity (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999), the increasing of which tends to present
a similar effect under mindlessness conditions. Similarly, subjects may have altered their
evaluations based on the presence of metaphor in the induction, which tends to elicit perceptions
of higher competence in a communicator (see Shen & Bigsby, 2013, for a review).
One major potential limitation of the online experiment was its attempt at deception in
eliciting responses from subjects. In the survey design, subjects were prompted to create their
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own "call-to-action" messages before then evaluating messages from other fabricated
respondents. Online survey participants are already more likely to deliberate more in their
message judgments in comparison to field or lab subjects (Liao et al, 2021; Miller et al, 1987).
This level of deliberation, especially if deception is detected, may result in subjects trending
negative in their evaluations. It was understood in the experimental design that online subjects
would not be responding under a state of expected mindlessness at the level of the field
experiment. However, the use of the more complex survey design may have primed even further
deliberation.
Furthermore, the online experiment elicited responses from communication student
subjects. Student samples are classically understood to be more compliant to researcher's
requests, resulting in reduced effect sizes, and, considering the directives of their teachers within
their communication classes, potentially more inclined to evaluate messages critically (Burnett &
Dune, 1986; McCroskey & Dunham, 1966; Rossiter, 1976). This may represent a clear
explanation for why students responded to social identity cues with lower (though nonsignificantly different) scores on believability in comparison to the control group. With more
information provided, and following the main propositions of the unimodel (Kruglanski &
Thompson, 1999), students may have acted in the direction of what they believed their teachers
(and the researcher) wanted: A punctilious and critical evaluation of communication.
This explanation may also address the measured effects of self-uncertainty in this project.
The salience of religious and sports identities was only subtly suggested so as to prevent early
deception detection, but students taking a survey as part of their completing communication
course requirements may have been inextricably behaving under a condition of salience for their
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student identities. If self-uncertainty plays a part in student subject behaviors, it could motivate
them even further to evaluate survey messages critically, as doing so may suggest clear
fulfillment of their student roles and reinforcement of their self-conceptual clarity.
Football fan self-categorization may have represented a problematic choice for some
respondents, as the categorization does not represent specific team affiliations. Negative
assessments related to football fan cues may have stemmed from individuals assigning negative
stereotypes to the categorization, even as respondents chose to identify themselves as football
fans. Secondary analysis on both cue groups could determine which categorizations showed
respondents choosing identity-matching materials for their own profile creations, and
respondents who chose the football fan identity for themselves may not have felt it appropriate to
display that categorization in the manner of the induction. Furthermore, sports team affiliation
and requisite rivalries with other affiliations can represent a contentious subject, as individuals
are more likely to harshly evaluate sources from a rival team (Bee & Dalakas, 2015). The sample
for this online study also attended a university that, during the data collection, featured on
national news for a public display of fan vandalism during a high-profile game. Consequently,
the football fan identity may have suffered pejoration at the time.
Future Research
The hypotheses tested in this study should be tested again in a less complex experimental
design, addressing a more diverse sample without using deceptive tactics and focusing on the
salience or relevance of the social identity under consideration. For this study, addressing a
student sample, subjects were not purposively collected according to their religious or sports
categorizations, and messages for evaluation (about helping the homeless) were not designed to

62
necessarily favor one group. To ensure the salience and appropriateness of the messages under
testing, however, such a screening may be necessary in future studies.
Put another way in the terms of this study, bullshit pseudo-reasoning may only be
significantly effective on Christians when it is supporting claims relevant to Christianity, in
addition to being accompanied by Christian source cues (Wyer, 2010). The necessity of such a
transformation of the experimental paradigm may suggest a reduction of ecological validity for
bullshit's effect, however.
Furthermore, though self-uncertainty's effects were minimal, the effects of group
identification and fusion may represent relevant phenomena for consideration. Individuals who
are self-uncertain may reduce their uncertainty through group membership, as UIT suggests, or
they may feel more uncertain when faced with some identities, particularly those social identities
with which they feel conflict (Choi & Hogg, 2020). Highly identity-fused individuals, on the
other hand, may not perform or judge in favor of their in-group for the sake of uncertainty
reduction so much as self-enhancement, as they consider their group and personal identities
inseparable (Swann et al, 2012). Self-uncertainty may be considered trait-like, but its effects are
highlighted when individuals are confronted with situationally increased self-uncertainty or
group-related threat (Hohman, Hogg 2018). Future studies stimulating a threat response,
especially if that threat necessitates turning to group sources, may address both the selfuncertainty aspects and epistemic authority aspects (Kruglanski et al, 2010) of understanding
receptivity to bullshit pseudo-reasoning.
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Chapter Four: Field Experiment
The field experiment tested the operationalization of bullshit pseudo-reasoning as a
communication tactic in the field with target compliance as the goal. If bullshit-receptive
message targets bias intuitive over reflective thinking, as Pennycook et al (2015) hypothesized,
then bullshit communication strategies, in a low-effort context, may affect compliance similarly
to placebic information. Langer et al (1978) and subsequent replications found that requests
accompanied by placebic information yielded compliance rates significantly higher than those
yielded by direct requests but did not differ significantly from the use of specific reasoning.
Langer et al (1978) posited that this effect stems from "mindlessness" in behavior, or the
common acting out of interactions according to stimulated heuristics without deliberation. The
judgment of bullshit statements as believable should also positively predict compliance for
bullshit-accompanied requests.
Varying source cues and message ambiguity again, the field experiment followed a
similar factorial design and general model as the online experiment, except with inductions
occurring in synchronous face-to-face conversations within a public situation. The field
experiment tested the following hypotheses patterned directly after those in the online
experiment, but with compliance as the outcome variable and requests accompanied by
reasoning as the message alternative to bullshit pseudo-reasoning. Furthermore, in contrast to the
online experiment’s use of a sports-related identity cue, the field experiment presented
identification with a university student group.
H6: (a) Source cues identifying the source as sharing the target's social categorization
positively predict compliance in comparison to the control. A positive relationship
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with (b) the social identifiability, i.e. social attractiveness and trustworthiness, of
the source, in sequence with (c) evaluation of message believability, mediates the
aforementioned source cue effect.
H7: Pseudo-reasoning messages do not differ significantly from reasoning in their
positive prediction of compliance in comparison to the control.
H8: (a) Distinctive social identity source cues and pseudo-reasoning messages interact to
produce effects on compliance greater than those in groups lacking either
induction. A positive relationship with (b) the social attractiveness and
trustworthiness of the source, in sequence with (c) evaluation of message
believability, mediates the aforementioned interaction effect.
H9: (a) Self-uncertainty positively predicts compliance with compliance gaining
messages combining social identity source cues and pseudo-reasoning
inspirational statements. (b) Self-uncertainty positively moderates the relationship
between social attractiveness/trustworthiness of the source and message
believability that mediate the aforementioned relationship.
Participants
On the campus of a large university in the Southern United States, research confederates
solicited subjects on public walkways. Fourteen confederates organized into pairs attempted
encounters with 446 individuals, and following message inductions, attempted to administer
post-hoc surveys and obtain informed consent.
Due to research confederate errors, 35 encounters were removed from the analysis. Of the
remaining attempts, 38 encounters involved respondents who rebuffed the requester without
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attending to the entire induction message, rendering the message reasoning inductions moot for
those cases. For the complete analysis of induction effects, 375 cases remained. Of these, 97
complied with requests to take the post-induction survey, in which participants reported
demographic information, and three were removed from the survey analysis for incomplete
responses. Additionally, in order to better account for potential sex effects, research confederates
were instructed late in the data collection period to record the sex of respondents who did not opt
to take the survey.
Of those responding, 45% self-identified as female and 49% as male, with 4% reporting
as nonbinary/third gender. With other-reported sex added, a further 24 individuals were
classified as female and 33 as male, with most of the sample's sex remaining unreported.
Furthermore, of those responding to the survey demographic items, 6% identified as Asian, 4%
identified as Black or African American, 85% identified as White, and 5% identified as "other."
Regarding religious categorizations, 3% identified as Buddhist, 63% as Christian, 26% as nonreligious, and 5% as "other." Regarding their relationship with the university hosting the
experiment, 81% reported affiliation. Reported ages of participants ranged from 18-37, with 20
the median reported age.
Procedure
Research confederates from a large Southern United States university’s student
population were trained in the experimental procedure, as well as research ethics, and carried out
the requisite experimental inductions without knowledge of the hypotheses. The prosocial
marketing test loosely followed the example of Gueguen et al (2015), who tested compliance
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with an organ donor registry request as an effect of message agents’ wearing religious
iconography.
Pairs of confederates, comprising one male and one female, wore religious or university
categorization paraphernalia for identity cue inductions and wore nothing distinctively socially
identifiable (either as belonging to the religious group or the university student group) for the
control group. The religious paraphernalia included a T-shirt bearing a cross logo and the name
of a fabricated religious organization on the front ("Spiritual Life Church") with a Bible verse
excerpt ("... for I am gentle and humble in heart…" ~ Matt. 11:29). Appendix B contains the
specific T-shirt design. Control paraphernalia consisted of black shirts, jeans, and minimal hair
accessories or jewelry.
Confederates did not select subjects, but instead approached any qualifying subject that
appeared in front of them. Confederates only approached those who appeared to be over the age
of 18 and/or walk without the accompaniment of a group. Confederates did not know the study's
hypotheses. Confederates generally alternated soliciting five subjects with the reasoning
induction, then five with the pseudo-reasoning induction, and so forth. Instruction of research
confederates involved trial preparation in public spaces, and female confederates, for the sake of
uniformity, were assigned the task of administering the inductions with research subjects. Male
confederates, alternatively, were assigned the task of soliciting informed consent, debriefing
subjects, and requesting that they complete the accompanying survey.
The procedure for solicitation ran as follows: One of the pair of confederates, appearing
alone but observed by the other from a short distance, approached a potential research subject
with a greeting that rapidly transitioned into the purpose of their approach. Depending on that
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instance’s activated induction, the confederate introduced their affiliation with "Spiritual Life
Church" before making the first request and providing the specific reason/pseudo-reason.
Carrying a noticeable clipboard with lists of signed names and email addresses, the confederate
requested that the target sign a petition if willing to spread the word and get more signatures.
This request preceded either (a) a specific reason for why the subject should get involved with
the scholarship, or (b) the inspirational bullshit item from the preliminary study and online
experiment, i.e., “Helping farm families shows a charitable heart, which plants the seeds of
progress.”
An example confederate script follows, with the religious group categorization induction
in italics.
"Hi! I'm from Spiritual Life Church, and we’re trying to help start up a new state
sponsored scholarship for students from [region] farming communities, so we're getting
signatures to show community interest.”
Following these statements, the confederate provided the pseudo-reasoning statement or
the following specific reasoning: "Helping out farm families will make it easier for them to come
back from pandemic income loss, and that in turn will help restore the economy."
The auxiliary confederate recorded the selected subject's responses: refusal or
compliance. Confederates did not attempt to respond to requests for elaboration regarding the
specific reasoning or bullshit statements beyond polite acknowledgement, stating "I'm not sure, I
just volunteered to get signatures,” and reiterating what was already said. Auxiliary confederates
made a note of targets who requested elaboration. For targets who immediately disengaged upon
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encounter with the confederate and left before debriefing, confederates tallied their refusal for
later considerations of the source cue effects.
If the target complied with the signature request, the confederate then suggested that they
write down their email address to show potential interest in helping spread awareness or raise
funds. The auxiliary confederate tallied the target's response as a potential marker of yet greater
compliance. Occurring at any time within the request episode, confederates also requested that
the subject take a one-page leaflet containing fabricated scholarship information and graphics,
with a false email address and incomplete phone number. Appendix B contains a leaflet example.
Finally, representing a fourth request, the confederate asked the message target to take more than
one leaflet to potentially pass them around to others.
After the compliance gaining episode resolved, the auxiliary member of the confederate
pair approached and debriefed the research subject, providing them with the informed consent
document, demographic questions, and questionnaires measuring the social attractiveness and
trustworthiness of the message source, the believability of their message, self-uncertainty, and
religious group affiliation and identification. Respondents received an incentive to immediately
complete the survey via entry into a lottery to win a gift card.
Measures
Apart from the measurement for compliance, analyzed along "refusal," and "compliance"
levels for the four requests, measurements for social attractiveness, trustworthiness, message
believability, and self-uncertainty involved adaptations of the scales used in the online
experiment. Identification, as used before, was also included for potential secondary analysis.
Scales were abbreviated to aid the appearance of a shorter survey in the field.
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Results
Measurement Models
Before hypothesis testing, each of the four relevant scale variables’ measurement models
was subjected to confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using SPSS AMOS in the same procedure
used for the Preliminary Study and the Online Experiment.
For the field experiment surveys, the CFA for social attractiveness yielded four items
(factor loadings M = 0.57, s = 0.39) in a unidimensional model showing moderate consistency
with the data, with RMSEA = .12, GFI = .97, χ 2 (2) = 5.08, ns. For trustworthiness, the CFA
yielded four items (factor loadings M = 0.77, s = 0.09) in a unidimensional model showing
moderate consistency with the data, with RMSEA = .14, GFI = .97, χ 2 (2) = 5.52, ns. The CFA
for believability yielded four items (factor loadings M = 0.76, s = 0.04) in a unidimensional
model showing consistency with the data, with RMSEA < .001, GFI = .99, χ 2 (2) = .34, ns. The
CFA for self-uncertainty yielded four items (factor loadings M = 0.70, s = 0.10) in a
unidimensional model showing moderate consistency with the data, with RMSEA = .11, GFI =
.98, χ 2 (2) = 4.38, ns. The CFA for the total complex model including all four constructs showed
questionable fit, yielding indices of RMSEA = .11, GFI = .80, χ 2 (98) = 198.70, p < .001. Table
17 presents the variable correlation matrix. Tables 18-21 present the items under analysis.
Regarding tests for the effect of sex, a T-test yielded no significant difference in
compliance (p = .62). Potential differences between research confederates was also tested via a
one-way ANOVA for the seven induction agents. Significant differences were found for some
research staff, F(6,368) = 8.80, p < .001 – therefore, further analyses controlled for the
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confederate difference effect, with none yielding an interaction effect between the categorical
variables and differences in confederates.
Of the 375-participant sample, 9.1% of respondents chose not to comply with any
request, 14.1% complied with the first request only, 22.7% complied with only the first two
requests, 23.7% complied with the first three requests, and 30.4% complied with all four
requests.
Hypothesis Testing
For the field experiment, H6 hypothesized that social identity cues would elicit greater
compliance in comparison to the control, and H7 hypothesized that both specific reasoning and
pseudo-reasoning, differing non-significantly from each other, would elicit greater compliance
than the control. H8 predicted that the categorical variables or pseudo-reasoning and identity
cues would interact positively. To test these hypotheses the data was first entered into an
ANOVA using the 375-participant data set. Table 22 presents the cell means.
The ANOVA did not detect significant main or interaction effects for the categorical
variables, the full model presenting F(8,366) = 1.24, p = .28, offering no support for the .
However, breaking the main effects down into linearly independent pairwise comparisons using
estimated marginal means for the population, the pseudo-reasoning condition showed a
significant difference from the control condition (p = .03). To explore this further, a test of linear
regression, dummy coding the categorical variables with control groups as referent, found a
significant effect of pseudo-reasoning on compliance, presenting R = .14, F(1,259) = 4.74, p =
.03.
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After the sample was limited to the 94 acceptable survey respondents, an ANOVA
revealed no significant main or interaction effects on compliance for the categorical variables,
the full model presenting F(8,366) = 1.24, p = .28. The hypotheses therefore were offered no
support by the overall model. However, a test of linear regression, dummy coding the categorical
variables, found a significant simple effect of pseudo-reasoning (M = 2.70) on compliance in
comparison to the control (M = 2.35), presenting R = .28, F(1,62) = 5.14, p = .03. The pseudoreasoning effect, according to further regression analyses on levels of the identity cues category,
showed significance only in combination with the religious identity cue (M = 3.78) in
comparison to the control (M = 2.76), R = .50, F(1,24) = 7.787, p = .01. However, the cell for the
interaction contained only a sample of 9 respondents, suggesting only very limited support for
the interaction hypothesis. See Table 23 for the cell means. Figure 3 depicts the differences
between categories on compliance for the surveyed sample.
Further ANOVAs for the intervening variables uncovered a significant effect on social
attractiveness, but none regarding trustworthiness or believability, thus eliminating the utility of
path analysis for the proposed model. The ANOVA testing social attractiveness as an outcome
variable detected significant differences, with F(8,85) = 4.17, p < .001. Though the main effects
were non-significant, a significant interaction effect of reasoning and identity cues was found for
social attractiveness, F(4,85) = 6.32, p < .001. A test of linear regression with dummy coding for
the message reasoning variable showed that, on the level of religious identity cues, pseudoreasoning (M = 6.31) showed a significant effect on social attractiveness in comparison to the
control (M = 5.13), R = .56, b = 1.17, t(24) = 3.30, p = .003. On the level of university identity
cues, reasoning (M = 6.47) showed a significant effect compared to the control (M = 5.61) on
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social attractiveness, with R = .54, b = .86, t(16) = 2.57, p = .02. On that same level, however,
pseudo reasoning (M = 4.73) also showed a significant effect, but in the reverse direction,
predicting lower evaluations than the control, R = -.54, b = .89, t(16) = -2.31, p = .02. However,
the small sample size for the surveyed group prevents the drawing of confident conclusions
regarding categorical interactions. See Table 24 for a summary of dummy-coded correlation
coefficients on the experiment outcome variables.
Among the survey respondents, ANCOVAs detected no interaction effect between selfuncertainty and the categorical variable effects for any of the source or message judgment
variables. H9 found no support.
ANOVA and regression analyses were conducted again when controlling for Christian
religious categorization, limiting the sample to 62 respondents, and university categorization,
limiting the sample to 72. However, controlling for categorization resulted in cell sample sizes
too small for relevant analysis. Furthermore, ANCOVAs with self-uncertainty still yielded no
interactions with categorical variables, thus eliminating support for H9.
Discussion
The hypotheses for the field experiment predicted similar patterns to the online study,
though with compliance as the outcome. The results were similar, showing a modest pattern in
line with some of the hypotheses, but generally non-significant results for overall models, as
between-group variance was not different enough from within-group variance. The effect of
reasoning type on compliance was found more robust than in the online experiment, according to
pair-wise dummy-coded regression tests of simple effects, and though no significant interactions
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were found on compliance via the overall ANOVA, pseudo-reasoning's effect was most
pronounced on the level of Christian identity cues.
Similar to the online study’s findings regarding trustworthiness, but presenting significant
interactions between the categorical factors, the field experiment discovered reasoning type
effects on social attractiveness. Pseudo reasoning yielded an effect in interaction with religious
social identity cues, and reasoning yielded a positive effect in interaction with university identity
cues, for which the overall ANOVA was significant. The pseudo-reasoning effect presented
positive social attractiveness with the Christian identity cues and negative results with the
university identity cues. When controlling for religious categorizations, no significant negative
effects in the university identity condition appeared.
On one hand, this suggests that the sample, primarily university students, may have
questioned the legitimacy of political action from a student group, expecting more specific
reasoning from their peers. Alternatively, the language of the pseudo-reasoning message may
have struck them as inappropriate for the student identity context. Students were approached in a
location where they knew encounters with street solicitors was likely, and social marketing can
reach a saturation point with populations that learn to ignore compliance gaining messages
(Gamian-Wilk & Dolinski, 2020) – prosociality may have been associated with religious identity
while a marketing orientation may have been associated with student identities. One other
potential explanation is that students, combining the social identity cue with the nature of the
compliance gaining message, may have attributed poor stereotypical qualities to individuals who
appeared connected to local, in this case Appalachian, identity groups, especially as the
inductions featured rural farming themes. Appalachian groups are commonly victims of negative
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stereotyping, such as involving drug addiction and poor education, and this stereotype engenders
disaffection from non-Appalachians (Rittenour et al, 2020).
In terms of the intervening variables, the proposed model could not be supported, though
some significant categorical variable effects were suggested by regression tests on social
attractiveness. Again, similar to the online study, some social identity cue effects were observed,
but not always in the predicted direction. Self-uncertainty, with the data collected, did not
display a noticeable effect.
Limitations
The most obvious limitation apparent in the field experiment was the meager collection
of surveys from respondents – perhaps an ambitious task, considering that each individual
approached by research staff were busily on their way somewhere else, and student confederates
found it nigh impossible to solicit survey responses from non-compliant subjects. This difficulty
in the field represents one of many potential limitations related to field work in general, as
individuals were likely moderated in their responses due to time of day, weather patterns,
workload based on time in the school year, news regarding COVID-19 policy, etc. Controlling
for self-categorization in the surveyed sample resulted in effects differing from the full data set,
and the dramatic reduction in sample size, with requisite increases in Type II error possibility,
could represent a more reliable cause for these different effects than the variable control.
Additionally, while results were supportive regarding social attractiveness, the variable yielded
problematic fit compared to the others, and featured a reliability alpha of only .61.
As with the online study, even considering the difficulty of obtaining surveys in the field,
a less complex factorial design would reduce this limitation (Smith et al, 2002). Additionally,
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paring down sample sizes may have caused difficulty in achieving fit for the measurement
models, especially regarding social attractiveness and parallelism between all the defined
variables. Another contributing factor may have been that respondents in the field, right after
having spoken to the message agent, were potentially uneasy about evaluating her while standing
nearby.
Research confederates became especially concerned when they wore the Christian social
identity cue T-shirt, as the area in which they most often collected data became the site of antiabortion protests from a local Christian group on more than one occasion. Research confederates
required continuous re-training in removing their own selection bias and resisting self-fulling
prophesies when they anecdotally perceived difficulty collecting data while using particular
inductions. Furthermore, each agent communicating the inductions to respondents took to the
training at different rates, and some maintained enthusiasm more than others.
The prosocial nature of the compliance gaining messages may have represented a major
limitation for the experiment. On one hand, prosocial messaging is known to drive compliance
effects and potentially blur the effects of structure or technique (Dillard & Hale, 1992). On the
other hand, the baseline request – about helping farm families – may have been so attractive on
its own that it contributed to range restriction (Dobson, 1988), as most subjects exhibited highly
compliant behavior. This may have been further exacerbated by most respondents’ identifying as
students and emerging adults, with their median reported age at 19 years, as they may have been
especially more inclined to respond positively to research confederate peers. Furthermore, the
baseline request solicited help for individuals from a particular region of the United States
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(Eastern Tennessee) from a particular social subset (farm families) – social identities likely
shared, but unaccounted for, by many of the experiment’s subjects.
The high overall compliance rate (91%) suggests that the field experiment’s sample may
represent only the upper end of a supposed population sample. If it were assumed that the range
restriction reflected only the top half of the normal distribution for the population, and that this
study population reflected only highly compliant individuals, then the standard deviation for the
sample would be assumed to be 60% as large as that of the population. Considering that
adjustment and applying the direct correction of range restriction (Schmidt & Hunter, 2015, pp.
128-129), the R = .14 for the contrast of pseudo-reasoning on compliance versus the control
would be recalculated to R' = .26. Using meta-analytic data, Samson-Secrieru and Carpenter
(2017), citing Boster et al (2016), assumed the maximum population variance for compliance as
.25. Using the same value in correcting for range restriction, the pseudo-reasoning effect would
be calculated as R' = .27. However, this still represents only a modest effect size, and without a
more direct comparison with meta-analyzed findings, the best course of action for resolving the
experiment’s range restriction problem is to engage in further investigations with more diverse
samples and more carefully designed requests.
Future Research
Field experimentation can be a complicated endeavor, but it represents an effective way
to highlight communication phenomena en vivo. From this dissertation’s results, pseudoreasoning appears to have only a modest effect on message acceptance and compliance.
However, for the subject of pseudo-reasoning bullshit, the parallels with placebic information are
worth exploring, taking constructs of threat and emotion into consideration. This has been
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exemplified in Dolinski et al’s (2002) work on the “fear then relief” compliance gaining
technique. In that study, the experimenters induced subjects to jaywalk before inducing a feeling
of threat in them by sounding a police whistle. Afterwards, the experimenters showed that the
whistle was a prank, and then initiated another confederate’s communication of a compliance
gaining message. Dolinski and colleagues found that an inducement of threat followed by an
inducement of relief stimulated a greater tendency in subjects to ignore the non-reasoning of
placebic messages.
Taking that phenomenon under consideration, it may be fruitful in future research to
consider not only the stimulation of uncertainty and/or fear in subjects, as has been addressed in
UIT, but also to apply that pattern to predicting the effectiveness of group leadership or mass
communication. The kinds of bad faith bullshit described by researchers such as Cohen (2002)
and Bengoetxea (2017) represent instances of powerful actors, seeking to deflect targets away
from challenging communication, using bullshit to inflate impressions of their status as the
“right” source of information. This may take the form of strategically highlighting an object of
fear or threat before, via pseudo-reasoning, creating an impression of the message agent as
capable of resolving that threat. Furthermore, self-uncertainty remains a variable that may yet be
assailable in the field, as further research may require its priming via challenging messages to
respondents (i.e. accusations of non-prototypicality), which may further motivate subjects toward
seeking quick resolutions in their message interpretation.
Though not as severe as in the results of the online study, this project found unexpected
negative effects for social identity cues. Religious categorizations may have been especially
reductive in the inductions, as some religious groups are more exclusivist than others, and may

79
regard an unfamiliar church with distrust. Religious affiliation represents more than the simple
performances displayed in the inductions, as the relational ties within religious groups are often
directly parallel to family support (Haji & Lalonde, 2012). Furthermore, young adults’ views of
religion tend to be in flux, and wildly varied, as they renegotiate their beliefs in an unfamiliar,
but sometimes liberating, college environment (Longest & Uecker, 2021).
Guéguen et al (2015) used Christian symbolism to predict prosocial compliance effects
with the understanding that, on a cultural level, their sample associated Christianity with good
will. This research assumed that individuals would attend to social identity as the unambiguous
message element toward which their judgments would shift, but it could be argued that a
discussion of “charitable” work further matches especially well with religious values and
rhetorical conventions (e.g., “Whoever closes his ear to the cry of the poor will himself call out
and not be answered,” Proverbs 21:13; English Standard Version Bible, 2001). Bullshit is less
often “called out” when it contains word choices that fit respondents’ ideological values
(Shedletsky, 2021).
Furthermore, the university identity cues involved attachment to a college environment
that regularly marketed social action to students, and all experiments took place during the first
semester returning to in-person classes during the 2021 COVID-19 pandemic, during which
prosocial health marketing became ubiquitous. While religious, university, and (per the online
study) sports-related social groups may represent strong sources of identification for research
subjects, a minimal groups approach within laboratory tasks could effectively account for
contextual moderators.

80
Chapter 5: General Discussion
This research purported to test “bullshit receptivity” (BSR) as individuals’ cognitive and
behavioral responses to bullshit within controlled influence communication processes. In that
sense, “bullshit” is effectively conceptualized as a form of pseudo-reasoning enacted within an
influence process that functionally replaces missing (or unwanted) reasoning. This assumes, for
contrast, a definition of “reasoning” adhering to conventions of argument necessitating
specificity, concreteness, and logical associations between claims and evidence (Grice, 1989;
Kuhn, 1991; Toulmin, 2003). On a strategic level, “bullshit” describes a mode of communication
that uses abstract, ambiguous, or otherwise equivocal message constructions in service to a
communicator’s desired impression formation. From early considerations of its psychological
antecedents to later investigations of its structure and function, bullshit involves the utterance of
claims that need not be true nor false, but, in their “unclarifiable unclarity” (Cohen, 2002),
capitalize upon a message target’s propensity for assigning meaning to bullshit messages. This
research proposed that individuals who accept bullshit assign meaning based upon their lay
epistemic motivation to seek, highlight, and clarify message elements that are relevant to a
syllogistic conclusion (Kruglanski et al, 2006; Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999).
The experiments in this project tested the general hypothesis that individuals
encountering claims or compliance gaining messages supported by bullshit pseudo-reasoning
would fail to differentiate them from reasoning, as pseudo-reasoning would appear to qualify as
evidence in favor of message acceptance and compliance. The hypotheses suggested that social
identity cues, particularly those with which subjects self-categorized, would facilitate subjects'
arresting of message evaluations and bias their processing in favor of message acceptance and
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compliance. Theory suggests individuals would approach the kind of abstract, ambiguous
messages involved in bullshit with interpretive tools empowered by the knowledge and attitude
structures normed within their group memberships (Schultz et al, 2008; Smith & Hogg, 2008).
The hypotheses predicted that social identity cues would positively interact with pseudoreasoning, assuming that the unambiguous cue information would focus subjects' judgment and
result in lenient evaluation of the intentionally ambiguous message arguments. It was suggested
that the ambiguous nature of pseudo-reasoning bullshit, putting definition within the imaginative
capabilities of the message receiver, could also result in greater effects than the conventional
reasoning approach when combined with social identity cues. Furthermore, the hypotheses
proposed that self-uncertainty would motivate the positive evaluation of pseudo-reasoning in
interaction with social identity cues. All of these hypotheses named message acceptance or
compliance as their outcomes, but with social attractiveness, trustworthiness, and believability
constructs measured as parts of the evaluation process.
Conservative statistical analysis by way of ANOVA and ANCOVA yielded little support
for the hypotheses regarding the outcome variables of message acceptance and compliance, and
the proposed path of source and message evaluations could not be supported. However, patterns
in line with the hypotheses appeared within tests of dummy-coded linear regression and some
ANOVA simple effects, particularly on the intervening variables of trustworthiness and social
attractiveness.
For the full online sample, and when controlling for identity categorizations, message
reasoning effects presented data in line with the hypotheses on the trustworthiness dependent
variable. Reasoning and pseudo-reasoning showed positive effects while not differing from each
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other, and this effect remained when controlling for Christian self-categorizations. For football
fans, only reasoning significantly affected message acceptance, and only pseudo-reasoning
significantly affected trustworthiness. No other patterns in line with the hypotheses appeared on
believability or message acceptance, and message reasoning type did not appear to interact
significantly with social identity cues. Self-uncertainty, for the full online sample, only positively
interacted with identity cue effects on the religious identity cue group on message acceptance
and social attractiveness. Only when controlling for football fan categorization did selfuncertainty show a similar interaction effect on message acceptance with the football fan identity
cue groups. Self-uncertainty appeared to have no interaction with the message reasoning
inductions.
For the full field sample, the overall ANOVA did not detect significant differences for
compliance, but simple effects testing showed a significant effect for pseudo-reasoning. For the
much smaller surveyed sample, again considering simple effects tested via dummy-coded linear
regression, pseudo-reasoning affected compliance significantly within the religious identity cue
condition, though the cell sample size was problematically small. Among the intervening
variables, only social attractiveness correlated significantly with compliance, and the results of
the overall ANOVA suggested that direct effects of the categorical variables were not strong
enough to fully support the hypothesized evaluation process.
Less than a third of the field sample responded to post-induction surveys, and this may
have contributed to the non-significance of some associations between responses to the survey
instruments and compliance. The preliminary replication study had detected a significant direct
effect of self-uncertainty on BSR, but the experiments found only negative associations with
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message judgement outcome variables, and in the field experiment showed no significant
interactions with subjects’ source or message evaluations. Still, significant interaction effects
between categorical variables appeared for social attractiveness. Reasoning positively affected
social attractiveness with the university identity cue, but pseudo-reasoning yielded a positive
effect for the religious identity cue and a negative effect for the university identity cue. However,
all detected interactions in the small surveyed sample involved minuscule cell sample sizes,
especially when controlling for self-categorization, therefore preventing substantial conclusions.
Between the preliminary replication study and the results of the experiments, selfuncertainty’s role in bullshit message judgements appeared inconsistent. On one hand this may
be due to differences in socially identifiable information between the studies. In the experiments,
subjects encountered individuals (or simulated individuals) who represented their student peers
in addition to the social identity cues associated with certain conditions, and their group-based
presentations may have interacted with subjects’ internal analysis of their own membership and
its presentation. Individuals who are highly identified with their groups more often report low
self-uncertainty, as their bond with their social group has leant them certainty (Choi & Hogg,
2020). Highly self-uncertain individuals, however, may yet feel insecure about their own
prototypicality, and they may find their self-concept threatened and/or be motivated to perform
membership by enacting criticism when viewing a peer (in age and social status) that makes
prosocial claims or performs prosocial acts.
The preliminary replication study did not present socially identifiable information – it
displayed statements assuming no details about source information other than those associated
with the research environment. This void of information, for an individual that persistently seeks
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out and depends on group-based epistemic authority, may stimulate them to retrieve attitudes and
evaluation-relevant information from their personal history with group-relevant knowledge.
Under uncertainty, individuals make judgments based on whatever relevant knowledge is
accessible to them (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999). Brown et al’s (2019) findings suggest that
individuals stimulated to use personalized, individual judgment sources are more likely to detect,
and negatively evaluate, bullshit. Highly self-uncertain individuals, however, persistently
depersonalize their self-conceptions in favor of group prototypes – when other individuals might
rely on individual attitudes, self-uncertain individuals likely turn to attitudes communicated
within their group-centered experiences. The knowledge structures produced by such
experiences may then guide the processing of source-unidentified bullshit statements.
Though effects were weak, evaluations of bullshit pseudo-reasoning appeared stronger
for compliance in the field experiment than message acceptance in the online experiment. Much
of the prior bullshit literature casts BSR as a message processing failure, but bullshit itself may
more often in nature represent an artifact of normal reality sharing communication processes
(Higgins, 1992; Spicer, 2020). Prior correlational analyses have also found associations with the
openness facet of conscientiousness and agreeableness personality dimensions (Čavojová et al,
2020; Pennycook et al, 2015). Self-uncertainty was selected as a construct for analysis in this
research partially under the assumption that individuals in search of relevant tools for evaluation
were psychologically dependent upon their groups, but individuals may also regard bullshit as an
interesting baseline for creative thought – a way of communicating that signals a cooperative
reality sharing heuristic. More than dependency and unresolved uncertainty, exploration and
affiliation could more directly motivate BSR when communication is more interpersonal.
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Anecdotally, research staff involved in the field experiment commonly reported that, after
debriefing, several subjects would express interest in the topics of the inductions and the study.
In contrast to the online experiment’s deindividuation, even minimal channel-rich interactions in
the field experiment could account for the stronger bullshit-compliance relationship and
significant effects on social attractiveness.
Bullshit pseudo-reasoning engendered a generally minor effect on the interpretations and
evaluation of influence messages. Further refinements and replications are required for the
experimental approaches, but even with corrections for range restriction and, potentially, error
attenuation, it appears that pseudo-reasoning, alone and in combination with social identity cues,
yields an effect, though weak and prone to moderation, on message acceptance, compliance, and,
possibly, other related influence outcomes.
Limitations
Design complexity represented a major limitation affecting this project, as increasing the
factors involved in ANOVA and ANCOVA increase the error rate, and using multiple levels
within factorial designs can make achieving sufficient cell sample sizes, ergo sufficient statistical
power, more difficult (Morrison, 2010; Smith et al, 2002).
That this research did not assess individuals’ attitudes about homelessness or the plight of
farm families represents a limitation of the studies, and future research should address
respondent attitudes in terms of both relevance to the context of communication as well as
individual value-relevant involvement, which both affect message deliberation (Johnson &
Eagly, 1989).
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One of the main limitations of this research involved its relatively uncomplex approach to
the highly complex field of concepts known to the social identity family of theories. Design
choices for these studies reflected considerations of induction subtlety and simplicity, but at the
cost of excluding some factors that would be effective to consider in later studies and secondary
analysis. For example, when further exploring the effects of social identity cues, more effort
should go toward priming and measuring the salience of social identity for respondents (Haslam
et al, 1999; Smith et al, 2007) and crafting inductions that represent issue relevance for the social
identity under question (Wyer, 2010).
This project’s samples also potentially limited its resulting effects, especially as student
samples may vary widely in their evaluative capabilities on levels of years in college and
discipline of study (Meltzer et al, 2012). Furthermore, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in
2020 resulted in moderating socio-psychological factors, such as gathering habits, the
communication and habituation of new health behavior patterns, and shaken trust in
epistemological authority (Shalev, 2021). As a result, many of the decisions made regarding
research design for these projects was more risk-sensitive than a pre-pandemic environment
would have allowed.
Implications and Future Research
Depending on individuals’ processing time, cognitive ability, access to relevant
information, and motivation to attend to messages and retrieve information relevant to their
processing, the use of bullshit pseudo-reasoning – parallel to many other persuasion and
compliance gaining techniques (Rains et al, 2018) – varies considerably in its effects. Bullshit’s
explication over time has not developed a list of sufficiency criteria for message content, but
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instead has broadly described it as carefully unmeaningful and un-substantive, used in
communication to support an impression, generally, that someone has something useful to say.
This set of studies has contributed somewhat to the understanding of “bullshit” as a
communication phenomenon functionally similar to placebic information, operationalizing it
with message structures known to the bullshit literature, such as abstraction and oblique
metaphor (Cohen, 2002; Thompson, 2016). Placebic information, another replacement for
reasoning in influence communication, yields effects comparable to reasoning, but not under
conditions of high request effort or attributions of agent responsibility and control (Langer et al,
1978).
What differentiates bullshit pseudo-reasoning from placebic information is that bullshit
does not represent a static placeholder containing non-information so much as a type of clarityobscuring strategy that, in combination with other stimulating factors, allows message targets to
assign novel meaning based on the attitude and knowledge structures that are accessible to them.
LET research has found that combining ambiguous message elements with elements that present
strength or positive valence results in targets’ biasing of message judgment in favor of the nonambiguous information. Erb et al’s (2007) experiments testing such a phenomenon featured
individuals making positive judgments, altered by stimuli from message arguments, about
ambiguous source cues. The current research featured familiar social-identity-based source cues
hypothesized to bias targets’ judgments about message content, but the results showed that these
cue effects were not consistently positive or negative across the samples. Menegatti and Rubini
(2013) carried out analyses that showed political leaders relying upon more abstract support for
their claims when addressing political ingroup members (i.e. their political base) than when
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addressing mixed groups or outgroups, and this finding is convergent with the understanding that
group leaders, in maintaining their social power, capitalize on individuals’ tendency to favor
prototypical ingroup messaging with less careful and negative deliberation than if the
information came from an outgroup (Clarkson et al, 2017; Hogg, 2018; Smith & Hogg, 2008).
Influence targets may more likely detect placebic information than bullshit pseudoreasoning, and further experimentation should test this in light of prior predictions (e.g. those of
Pennycook & Rand, 2019) suggesting that BSR occurs because of impulsiveness and/or
unmotivated reasoning. Bullshit likely retains an effect, at least on source judgments, under
conditions of more careful message deliberation than what would be expected under conditions
of mindlessness. The hypotheses and results of the current research point to BSR as relying upon
individuals’ arrested judgment processes. In Spinozan processing terms, targets should divert
their message judgment toward automatized biases before their deliberative faculties can
differentiate pseudo-reasoning from reasoning. However, some of the attractiveness of pseudoreasoning may lie in its stimulation of just enough deliberative judgement to allow respondents
to make connections between the information in the influence message and their prior attitudes.
A similar explanation has been put forward for the tendency of message targets to positively
evaluate metaphor-accompanied messages and their sources (see Shen & Bigsby, 2013, for a
review).
The structures of compliance gaining techniques in particular present commonly weak
and inconsistent effects. Prior attitudes and requisite behavioral intentions represent the most
powerful predictors of influence outcomes (Rains et al, 2018). Recent research has shown that
impulsiveness and low cognitive reflective behavior, though highlighted as strong predictors in

89
previous correlational BSR studies, do not present consistent effects in experiments addressing
attitudinal and source credibility factors (Littrell et al, 2020; Littrell et al, 2022).
The experiments within this dissertation featured bullshit as an influence technique
without the facilitation of particularly effortful exchange or coordination between interlocutors.
In the online study, respondents engaged with an asynchronously presented, anonymous writer of
very little information. In the field experiment, respondents engaged in fleeting encounters with a
message agent who followed a simple script. In sum, the communication behaviors featured in
this project represented mainly impersonal interactions. Bullshit under a broader
conceptualization, which takes into account its proposed function as a kind of casual social
binder in coordination between communicators (Frankfurt, Spicer), suggests that its effects may
be more readily observable under conditions of interpersonal conversation.
Individuals share reality often by engaging in ambiguous and abstract "tuning" with one
another (Echterhoff et al, 2009; Higgins, 1992), in which they tailor their messages to match the
perceived attitudes of their audience, especially when goals of affiliation are shared. The
message judgments involved in this research may not represent the most important processinglevel constructs within an informal conversation, as individuals may not be motivated to judge
each other's message qualities so much as each other's potentiality for positive relationship and
communication outcomes. The predicting of communication outcomes or reduction of
interpersonal uncertainty represent classically understood fundamental processes in
communication (Berger & Calabrese, 1975; Sunnafrank, 1988).
Though bullshit has been named a strategy familiar to more deceptive actors
(Bengoetxea, 2017; Cohen, 2002; Frankfurt, 2005; Thompson, 2016; Van Bavel et al, 2020),
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those message patterns likely achieve their function when the actor's audience perceives them as
a source with whom they share a relationship, and bullshitters may enact more or less deceptive
and cooperative goals in their relational communication. Humans sometimes develop, maintain,
and draw boundaries in relationships by exchanging incrementally more or less equivocal
communication, and future research should examine the use of bullshit tactics within not only the
construction of lies, but also the careful utterance of difficult truths (McCornack et al, 2014).
Relational factors also should contribute to individuals’ judgments of epistemic authority, and
this is highlighted in prior social identification and identity fusion literature (Besta et al, 2016;
Shalev, 2021; Smith et al, 2007; Swann et al, 2012), as individuals expand in their self-view and
apprehension of reality via their experiences with others, particularly those with whom they can
form and reinforce a social identity.
Furthermore, considering the identities presented in this research, relationship strength
and the social stakes associated with ties in Christian groups, football fan groups, and university
groups likely differ to the extent that identification, its stability, and its relationship to norms of
communication and influence produce differing effects on judgments of other group members
and their communication. Social identification is a dynamic phenomenon informed by
individuals’ on-line judgments about interactants, and specific goals related to situational context
can change perceptions of group prototypes, though core value perceptions tend to remain stable
(Hogg & Smith, 2007). Purposive sampling and measurements of group entitativity, or the
consensual unification of group members into perceiving their group as a synergistic whole, may
address social group differences. On the other hand, controlled laboratory testing assigning
subjects into minimal groups has effectively illuminated some identification effects within the
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social identity construct’s history (Hogg, 2007; Mullin and Hogg, 1998). The discrepancy
between self-uncertainty’s effect in the preliminary study and its lack of effect in the experiments
may represent the result of error due to some identities creating, rather, than reducing uncertainty
(Choi & Hogg, 2020). Furthermore, a minimal groups approach would allow researchers more
control over the foci of group prototypicality and requisite social and/or epistemic authority.
Self-uncertainty more consistently motivates individuals to perform group identification
and positively evaluate ingroup-supported messages when both social identity and selfuncertainty are made salient by the recognition of an active threat to either or both (Choi &
Hogg, 2020). A need for uncertainty reduction should especially motivate subjects’ judgments
when, specifically, collective identity is called into question, and this can take the form of threats
to a group’s unity or challenges to an individual’s membership (Hogg & Mahajan, 2018;
Hohman et al, 2017). Therefore, future research addressing self-uncertainty as a potential cause
for BSR should induce threat. This would further extend and follow the pattern set by Brown et
al (2019) in inducing need for belongingness, a predictor of BSR, within a minimal groups game.
Adding another layer, the current research did not address individuals’ assessments of messages
from sources with whom they did not share identities, and future research considering identity
factors should investigate how bullshit is coordinated and interpreted when communicated by an
outgroup member and/or featuring value-dissonant message content.
Conclusion
Prior research on BSR phenomena has suggested that some individuals have a trait-like
susceptibility to the evaluation of “meaningless” message constructions as meaningful. A more
interaction-based communication approach to the bullshit concept would suggest that to qualify
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an objective standard of meaningfulness would represent a limited view of the concept, and that
any meaning ascribed to bullshit must come from coordinated understanding between
interactants in a communication process. The results of this research suggest that the targets of
influence attempts are generally motivated to make positive judgements about message agents (if
not as much the messages themselves) when influence communication features constructions that
appear to represent supportive reasoning, whether that reasoning adheres to classic standards of
clarity or not. In a lesser fashion, this set of studies, notwithstanding requisite systematic and
random error, yielded some evidence that individuals make judgements about persuasive and
compliance gaining messages in favor of accessible message elements, such as social identity
cues. Further controlled testing is necessary for the hypothesis that bullshit pseudo-reasoning, by
dint of its construction as a kind of communication puzzle piece meant to fit all other pieces,
facilitates message targets’ activation of accessible knowledge and attitude structures.
If “bullshit” represents a kind of superordinate communication strategy that replaces
missing or unwanted reasoning with pseudo-reasoning, then its explication requires systematic
attention to the subordinate message constructs – such as ambiguity, metaphor, or sesquipedalian
word choice – that yield different simple cue effects within different communication contexts.
Additionally, including and beyond social identities, further testing should address the control of
message and situational elements that bias message processing, such as the inclusion of
threatening and uncertainty-stimulating information. Furthermore, addressing situational and
broader context, it remains important to consider that bullshit, in the view of communication as a
dynamic and constitutive process, involves rules and patterns of communication that may find
definition according to the social goals and linguistic histories of particular groups (Dalton,
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2016; Spicer, 2020). This research used an induction featuring language that may not represent
universally understood abstraction and ambiguity, regardless of the communicator’s intention for
it, but the function of the messages was situated within the communication of persuasion and
compliance gaining. Bullshit’s explication has been overdependent on cognition-based
correlational investigations divorced from situation – without translating the concept to processes
within nature, it remains an artifact of the academic imagination.
Ideally, future experiments should examine the full process of bullshit communication,
controlling social and situational antecedents, such as pressure to perform (Petrocelli et al, 2019);
priming and measuring psychological antecedents, such as “low concern for truth” (Frankfurt);
testing differences between subordinate message structures, such as “International Art
Language” (Turpin et al, 2020); and observing communication outcomes and moderating factors,
such as source credibility and prior attitudes (Littrell et al, 2022). Further research is needed that
presents bullshit tactics and their interpretation as occurring within controlled communication
episodes measured with sufficiently defined instruments. Otherwise, “bullshit” suffices only to
describe itself.
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Appendix A: Instruments
Primary Instruments
Believability
Message believability was assessed using McCroskey & Teven's (1999) five semantic
differential items.
Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disagree
False 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 True
Incorrect 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Correct
Wrong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Right
Yes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 No
Compliance
Immediate compliance utilizes a measurement assigning scores according to whether
respondents did or did not comply with the three requests, coding responses as follows:
0: No compliance.
1: Compliance with one request.
2: Compliance with two requests.
3: Compliance with three requests.
4: Compliance with all four requests.
Confederates will also take note of unpredicted emergent phenomena, such as
respondents who request elaboration and respondents who immediately disengage with the
confederate.
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"Inspirational" Bullshit Receptivity
The following 16 bullshit items and 4 mundane statements (italicized below), shuffled, tested
target bullshit receptivity in the preliminary study. A 7-point Likert scale judging the messages'
inspirational quality followed each statement. The analysis used the mundane items’ scores for
contrast, a check similar to that used by Pennycook et al (2015) and Evans et al (2020).
1. A charitable heart plants the seeds of progress.
2. If we all do our part, the impossible becomes possible.
3. Human potential is unlocked when we strive for generosity.
4. A true hero does good deeds for others, and those deeds make new heroes.
5. Generous citizenship creates a legacy of hope.
6. Only optimistic sacrifice can end the blight of poverty.
7. Self-sacrifice is a policy that lifts people up.
8. Without social responsibility, there is no unity, and without unity, there is no progress.
9. Helping the needy strengthens the bond of the brotherhood of man.
10. Generosity toward the less fortunate opens a door to community fellowship.
11. Charity is the soul of grace, and grace is the hallmark of a good community.
12. Giving someone a hand up creates a blossoming of karmic glory.
13. Giving is the concrete that lays the foundations of civilization.
14. Love between people is the cause and reward of unselfish action.
15. A charitable spirit is the key to bringing all citizens together.
16. Giving of yourself to others is the first step in building a community spirit.
17. Combining resources means access to more resources.
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18. The poor are often in need of help.
19. Social cooperation is often a part of a culture's value system.
20. Individuals sometimes ask for your money because they need it.
Message Acceptance
Message acceptance was loosely adapted from Zhao et al's (2011) perception of argument
strength scale, involving selected items that could address any informational message type.
Italicized items are reverse-coded.
1. This person shared information that is important to me.
2. The message they shared helped me feel confident.
3. The message they shared put thoughts in my mind that made me want to pay attention.
4. The message they shared made me want to stop paying attention.
5. Their messages made me think good thoughts.
An additional four items were adapted from LaFrance and Boster's (2001) argument
quality scale, converted from semantic differentials into Likert-type items.
1. Their message was convincing.
2. Their message was reasonable.
3. Their message was unsound.
4. What they said was plausible.
Pseudo-Profound Bullshit Receptivity
The items used below represent high-mean-scoring items from Pennycook et al’s (2015)
original studies. Each item is followed by a Likert scale measuring the degree to which
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respondents found the statement “profound.” For the sake of survey uniformity, the measure was
adapted for these studies to a 7-point structure:
1. Hidden meaning transforms unparalleled abstract beauty.
2. Wholeness quiets infinite phenomena.
3. Consciousness is the growth of coherence, and of us.
4. Perceptual reality transcends subtle truth.
5. As you self-actualize, you will enter into infinite empathy that transcends understanding.
6. Our minds extend across space and time as waves in the ocean of the one mind.
7. Every material particle is a relationship of probability waves in a field of infinite
possibilities. You are that.
8. Nature is a self-regulating ecosystem of awareness.
9. We are not an emergent property of a mechanical universe but the seasonal activity of a
living cosmos.
10. As beings of light we are local and non-local, time bound and timeless actuality and
possibility.
Self-Uncertainty
Self-uncertainty is measured with 12 7-point Likert items eliciting level of agreement
with the following statements based on an instrument used in recent tests of UIT (Hohman et al,
2017; Hohman & Hogg, 2015), with numbers 6 and 11 reverse coded:
1. My beliefs about myself often conflict with one another.
2. On one day I might have one opinion of myself, and on another day I might have a
different opinion.
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3. I wonder about what kind of person I really am.
4. I feel that I am not really the person I appear to be.
5. When I think about the kind of person I have been in the past, I’m not sure what I was
really like.
6. I seldom experience conflict between the different aspects of my personality.
7. I think I know other people better than I know myself.
8. My beliefs about myself seem to change very frequently.
9. If I were asked to describe my personality, my description might end up being different
from one day to another.
10. Even if I wanted to, I don’t think I would tell someone what I’m really like.
11. In general, I have a clear sense of who I am and what I am.
12. It is often hard for me to make up my mind about things because I don’t really know what
I want.
Social Attractiveness
Social identifiability, using a method similar to Carr et al (2013), was measured using 12
social attraction items from McCroskey et al (2006) on 7-point Likert-type agreement scales in
addition to an eighth item addressing perception of the source's group status. Reverse-coded
items are italicized.
1. I think he/she could be a friend of mine.
2. I would like to have friendly chat with her/him.
3. It would be difficult to meet and talk with her/him.
4. We could never establish a personal friendship with each other.
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5. He/she just wouldn't fit into my circle of friends.
6. He/she would be pleasant to be with.
7. He/she is sociable with me.
8. I would not like to spend time socializing with this person.
9. I could become close friends with her/him.
10. He/she is easy to get along with.
11. He/she is unpleasant to be around.
12. This person is not very friendly.
Trustworthiness
Source trustworthiness was measured using McCroskey & Teven's (1999) six semantic
differential items measuring source trustworthiness.
Honest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Dishonest
Untrustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Trustworthy
Honorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Dishonorable
Moral 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Immoral
Unethical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Ethical
Phoney 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Genuine
Auxiliary Instruments
Agreeableness
Trait agreeableness was measured using the HEXACO-60 (Ashton & Lee, 2009) scale of
the Big Five Personality traits, which analyzes the agreeableness construct along construct
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“facets” of forgiveness, gentleness, flexibility, and patience. Items 3, 6, 8, and 9 are reversecoded.
1. I rarely hold a grudge, even against people who have badly wronged me.
2. My attitude toward people who have treated me badly is “forgive and forget.”
3. People sometimes tell me that I am too critical of others.
4. I tend to be lenient in judging other people.
5. Even when people make a lot of mistakes, I rarely say anything negative.
6. People sometimes tell me that I’m too stubborn.
7. I am usually quite flexible in my opinions when people disagree with me.
8. When people tell me that I’m wrong, my first reaction is to argue with them.
9. People think of me as someone who has a quick temper.
10. Most people tend to get angry more quickly than I do.
Conspiracy Belief
Fifteen items were adapted 7-point Likert-type items from Brotherton et al’s (2013) short
form generic conspiracist beliefs scale. The original scale measured five factors, but the authors
suggest the short form as a unidimensional measure in practical use. Pennycook et al (2015) also
used the 15-item short form.
1. The government is involved in the murder of innocent citizens and/or well known public
figures, and keeps this a secret.
2. The power held by heads of state is second to that of small unknown groups who really
control world politics.
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3. Secret organizations communicate with extraterrestrials, but keep this fact from the
public.
4. The spread of certain viruses and/or diseases is the result of deliberate, concealed efforts
of some organization.
5. Groups of scientists manipulate, fabricate, or conceal evidence in order to deceive the
public.
6. The government permits or perpetrates acts of terrorism on its own soil, disguising its
involvement.
7. A small, secret group of people is responsible for making all major world decisions, such
as going to war.
8. Evidence of alien contact is being concealed from the public.
9. Technology with mind control capacities is used on people without their knowledge.
10. New and advanced technology which would harm current industry is being suppressed.
11. The government uses people as patsies to hide its involvement in criminal activity.
12. Certain significant events have been the result of the activity of a small group who
secretly manipulate world events.
13. Some UFO sightings and rumors are planned or staged in order to distract the public from
real alien contact.
14. Experiments involving new drugs or technologies are routinely carried out on the public
without their knowledge or consent.
15. A lot of important information is deliberately concealed from the public out of selfinterest.
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Group Identification
Group identification was measured using the 10-item pattern of adaptation from previous
social identity research presented in Hogg & Hains (1998), with 7-point Likert scales of
agreement:
1. Members of my religious group are important to me.
2. I identify with other members of my religious group.
3. I have strong ties with other members of my religious group.
4. I am happy to identify myself as a member of my religious group.
5. I feel a strong sense of belonging with other members of my religious group.
6. I would rather belong to my own religious group than to another religious group.
7. I like other members of my religious group.
8. My attitudes and beliefs are similar to those of other members of my religious group.
9. I feel I fit in well with other members of my religious group.
10. Members of my religious group work well together as a team.
Identity Fusion
Identity fusion scale items came from Gomez et al (2011) and were adapted for selected
group categorization. In this list, the default “my group” descriptor is shown.
1. I am one with my religious group.
2. I feel immersed in my religious group.
3. I have a deep emotional bond with my religious group.
4. My religious group is me.
5. I’ll do for my religious group more than any of the other members would do.
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6. I am strong because of my religious group.
7. I make my religious group strong.
Need for Cognitive Closure
A short form of the NFCC scale items were adapted from (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011) with
the scale treated as a unidimensional measure, as had been done in previous research (Roets &
Van Hiel, 2007).
1. I find that a well-ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament.
2. I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more.
3. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.
4. I don’t like to go into a situation without knowing what I expect from it.
5. I don’t like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions.
6. I dislike unpredictable situations.
7. When I have made a decision, I feel relieved.
8. When I am confronted with a problem, I am dying to reach a solution very quickly.
9. I would quickly become impatient and irritated if I would not find a solution to a problem
immediately.
10. I don’t like situations that are uncertain.
11. I feel uncomfortable when I don’t understand the reason why an event occurred in my
life.
12. I dislike it when a person’s statement could mean many different things.
13. I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways.
14. I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group believes.
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15. I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own view.
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Appendix B: Induction Elements
Chapter 3 Icon Choices

Chapter 3 Control Induction
The following are profile elements chosen and written by another respondent from a prior
study or earlier in this study:

Avatar:
Catch Phrase: You do you!
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Inspiring/Call-to-action Message: I think everyone should help the homeless more
often.
Chapter 3 Religion and Pseudo-Reasoning Induction
The following are profile elements chosen and written by another respondent from a prior
study or earlier in this study:

Avatar:
Catch Phrase: “I am gentle and humble in heart” – Matthew 11:29
Inspiring/Call-to-action Message: I think everyone should help the homeless more
often. Giving to shelters shows a charitable heart, which plants the seeds of progress.
Chapter 3 Sports and Reasoning Induction
The following are profile elements chosen and written by another respondent from a prior
study or earlier in this study:

Avatar:
Catch Phrase: Football is life
Inspiring/Call-to-action Message: I think everyone should help the homeless more
often. Giving to shelters means rehab and resources to help them rejoin and give back to
society
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Chapter 4 Social Identity Inductions
The following design adorned a T-shirt worn by the research confederate in the religious
group categorization induction (next page). For the university induction, confederates wore
apparel with the university logo.
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Chapter 4 Print Material
The field experiment involved the use of a signed petition with lines for email addresses
following each signature line. Additionally, the confederates offered small leaflets promoting
possible further information for the subject of the request, the design for which follows.

Help our Eastern
Tennessee farm kids
go to college!
The Dennis Fund scholarship, if
sponsored by the Tennessee Department
of Education, will help incoming students
from farm communities
• major in the sciences at our state
higher education institutions.
• get support for career education
and development in agriculture.
We need community support and enough
signatures to put this on the official
education platform!
For more information, call
(662)245544, or email us at
DennisFund6489@gmail.com
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Appendix C: Tables
Chapter 2 Tables
Table 1
Descriptives, alphas, and correlations
Variables

M, SD, α

1

1. IBSR

5.11, 1.16, .91

2. PPBSR

4.77, 1.42, .89

.75**

3. SU

3.94, 1.88, .95

.38**

2

3

.47**

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01; IBSR = inspirational bullshit receptivity, PPBSR = pseudo-profound
bullshit receptivity, SU = self-uncertainty.

Table 2
Descriptives and factor loadings for inspirational BSR
M

SD

Min-Max

5.38

1.35

1-7

Factor
Loadings
.68

5.16

1.58

1-7

.70

A true hero does good deeds for others, and those
deeds make new heroes.

5.13

1.51

1-7

.72

Without social responsibility, there is no unity, and
without unity, there is no progress.

4.97

1.50

1-7

.57

5.12

1.53

1-7

.79

4.97

1.58

1-7

.78

5.04

1.51

1-7

.78

5.10

1.42

1-7

.78

Items
A charitable heart plants the seeds of progress.
If we all do our part, the impossible becomes
possible.

Giving is the concrete that lays the foundations of
civilization.
Love between people is the cause and reward of
unselfish action.
A charitable spirit is the key to bringing all citizens
together.
Giving of yourself to others is the first step in
building a community spirit.
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Table 3
Descriptives and factor loadings for pseudo-profound BSR
M

SD

Min-Max

Factor
Loadings

Hidden meaning transforms unparalleled abstract
beauty.

4.73

1.85

1-7

.83

Perceptual reality transcends subtle truth.

4.76

1.77

1-7

.78

As you self-actualize, you will enter into infinite
empathy that transcends understanding.

4.88

1.78

1-7

.81

Our minds extend across space and time as waves in
the ocean of the one mind.

4.66

1.79

1-7

.78

Every material particle is a relationship of
probability waves in a field of infinite
possibilities. You are that.

4.83

1.70

1-7

.69

We are not an emergent property of a mechanical
universe but the seasonal activity of a living cosmos.

4.76

1.72

1-7

.65

Items

Table 4
Descriptives and factor loadings for self-uncertainty
M

SD

Min-Max

Factor
Loadings

4.00

2.02

1-7

.92

4.05

2.00

1-7

,88

When I think about the kind of person I have been
in the past, I’m not sure what I was really like.

3.82

1.99

1-7

.89

I think I know other people better than I know
myself.

3.91

2.15

1-7

.90

My beliefs about myself seem to change very
frequently.

3.91

2.08

1-7

.88

Items
On one day I might have one opinion of myself,
and on another day I might have a different
opinion.
I wonder about what kind of person I really am.
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Table 5
Per-item inspirationality and ambiguity for IBSR
Inspirational Ambiguous
Items

M

SD

M

SD

1. A charitable heart plants the seeds of progress.

5.38

1.35

5.16

1.38

2. Human potential is unlocked when we strive for generosity.

5.16

1.59

4.90

1.48

3. A true hero does good deeds for others, and those deeds make
new heroes.

5.28

1.50

4.61

1.69

4. Generous citizenship creates a legacy of hope.

5.13

1.51

4.96

1.66

5. Only optimistic sacrifice can end the blight of poverty.

4.73

1.70

4.98

1.39

6. If we all do our part, the impossible becomes possible.

5.32

1.39

4.96

1.62

7. Self-sacrifice is a policy that lifts people up.

4.92

1.70

4.69

1.61

8. Without social responsibility, there is no unity, and without
unity, there is no progress.

4.97

1.50

4.57

1.63

9. Helping the needy strengthens the bond of the brotherhood of
man.

5.13

1.50

4.59

1.67

10. Generosity toward the less fortunate opens a door to
community fellowship.

5.08

1.48

4.59

1.61

11. Charity is the soul of grace, and grace is the hallmark of a
good community.

5.25

1.53

4.71

1.79

12. Giving someone a hand up creates a blossoming of karmic
glory.

4.64

1.71

5.12

1.42

13. Giving is the concrete that lays the foundations of civilization.

5.12

1.53

4.67

1.59

14. Love between people is the cause and reward of unselfish
action.

4.97

1.58

4.76

1.67

15. A charitable spirit is the key to bringing all citizens together.

5.04

1.51

4.41

1.77

16. Giving of yourself to others is the first step in building a
community spirit.

5.10

1.42

4.78

1.81
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Table 5 (Continued)
Per-item inspirationality and ambiguity for IBSR
Inspirational
Items

Ambiguous

M

SD

M

SD

17. Combining resources means access to more resources.

4.73

1.83

4.39

1.87

18. The poor are often in need of help.

4.29

1.97

4.06

2.05

19. Social cooperation is often part of a culture's value system.

4.71

1.71

4.61

1.75

4.05

2.09

3.67

2.01

20. Individuals sometimes ask for your money because they need
it.
Note: “Mundane” items are in italics.
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Chapter 3 Tables
Table 6
Descriptives, alphas, and correlations
Variables

M, SD, α

1

2

3

1. SA

4.96, 0.92, .73

2. TRU

5.39, 1.07, .84

.54**

3. BEL

5.90, 1.20, .95

.36**

.39**

4. ACC

4.70, 1.13, 88

.51**

.51**

.48**

5. SU

4.10, 1.08, .84

-.19**

-.12*

-.02

4

-.08

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01; SA = social attractiveness, TRU = trustworthiness, BEL =
believability, ACC = message acceptance, SU = self-uncertainty.

Table 7
Descriptives and factor loadings for social attractiveness
Items
I think he/she could be a friend of mine.
It would be difficult to meet and talk with her/him.
He/she would be pleasant to be with.
He/she is easy to get along with.
Note: Italicized item is reverse-coded.

M

SD

Min-Max

Factor
Loadings

5.14
5.05
5.03
5.06

1.26
1.40
1.12
1.04

1-7
1-7
1-7
1-7

.72
.41
.76
.74
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Table 8
Descriptives and factor loadings for trustworthiness
Items
Honest ... Dishonest
Trustworthy ... Untrustworthy
Unethical ... Ethical
Phony ... Genuine
Note: Italicized item is reverse-coded.

M

SD

Min-Max

5.56
5.27
5.63
5.10

1.15
1.28
1.24
1.54

1-7
1-7
1-7
1-7

M

SD

Min-Max

5.92
5.85
5.89
5.93

1.26
1.31
1.29
1.29

1-7
1-7
1-7
1-7

M

SD

Min-Max

5.05

1.31

1-7

4.08

1.47

1-7

4.66

1.43

1-7

5.13
4.60

1.23
1.48

1-7
1-7

Factor
Loadings
.71
.82
.70
.79

Table 9
Descriptives and factor loadings for believability
Items
False ... True
Incorrect ... Correct
Wrong ... Right
Yes ... No
Note: Italicized item is reverse-coded.

Factor
Loadings
.95
.91
.90
.88

Table 10
Descriptives and factor loadings for message acceptance
Items
This person shared information that is important to
me.
The message they shared helped me feel confident.
The message they shared put thoughts in my mind
that made me want to pay attention.
Their messages made me think good thoughts.
Their message was convincing.

Factor
Loadings
.63
.74
.85
.77
.85
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Table 11
Descriptives and factor loadings for self-uncertainty
Items
My beliefs about myself often conflict with one
another.
On one day I might have one opinion of myself, and
on another day I might have a different opinion.
I wonder about what kind of person I really am.
I feel that I am not really the person I appear to be.
When I think about the kind of person I have been in
the past, I’m not sure what I was really like.
I seldom experience conflict between the different
aspects of my personality.
I think I know other people better than I know
myself.
My beliefs about myself seem to change very
frequently.
If I were asked to describe my personality, my
description might end up being different from one
day to another.
It is often hard for me to make up my mind about
things because I don’t really know what I want.
Note: Italicized item is reverse-coded.

M

SD

Min-Max

Factor
Loadings

3.85

1.65

1-7

.73

4.64

1.67

1-7

.72

4.51
3.65

1.83
1.71

1-7
1-7

.65
.62

3.97

1.69

1-7

.53

4.10

1.56

1-7

.07

3.79

1.67

1-7

.49

3.89

1.65

1-7

.78

4.01

1.70

1-7

.72

4.62

1.67

1-7

.57
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Table 12
Full data cell means for message acceptance
Identity Cue:

None (Control)

Religious

Sports

Total

Control Message

M = 4.75,
SD = 0.89
n = 40

M = 4.74,
SD = 1.25
n = 40

M = 4.24,
SD = 1.15
n = 39

M = 4.58,
SD = 1.12
n = 119

Specific Reasoning

M = 4.78,
SD = 1.09
n = 40

M = 4.87,
SD = 1.16
n = 40

M = 4.88,
SD = 1.12
n = 38

M = 4.84,
SD = 1.11
n = 118

Pseudo-Reasoning

M = 4.95,
SD = 0.99
n = 37

M = 4.52,
SD = 1.25
n = 38

M = 4.62,
SD = 1.20
n = 38

M = 4.69,
SD = 1.16
n = 113

Total

M = 4.82,
SD = 0.99
n = 117

M = 4.71,
SD = 1.22
n = 118

M = 4.58,
SD = 1.18
n = 115

M = 4.70,
SD = 1.13
n = 350

TRU

BEL

Table 13
Full data dummy-coded categorical effects
Variable:

SA

ACC

Specific Reason

R = .10, p = .15

R = .20, p = .002 R = -.07, p = .29

R = .12, p = .07

Pseudo-reason

R = .05, p = .43

R = .18, p = .01

R = -.07, p = .27

R = .05, p = .46

Religious

R = -.11, p = .11

R = -.01, p = .90

R = -.18, p = .01

R = -.05, p = .46

Sports

R = -.18, p = .01

R = -.18, p = .01

R = -.01, p = .86

R = -.11, p = .09

Note: SA = social attractiveness, TRU = trustworthiness, BEL = believability, ACC = message
acceptance. Message factor correlations calculated with control groups (no reason, no identity
cue) as referents.
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Table 14
Full data cell means for trustworthiness
Identity Cue:

None (Control)

Religious

Sports

Total

Control Message

M = 5.42,
SD = 0.98
n = 40

M = 5.28,
SD = 1.14
n = 40

M = 4.64,
SD = 1.15
n = 39

M = 5.12,
SD = 1.13
n = 119

Specific Reasoning

M = 5.58,
SD = 1.02
n = 40

M = 5.66,
SD = 1.15
n = 40

M = 5.47,
SD = 1.02
n = 38

M = 5.57,
SD = 1.06
n = 118

Pseudo-Reasoning

M = 5.56,
SD = 1.00
n = 37

M = 5.47,
SD = 1.07
n = 38

M = 5.36,
SD = 0.83
n = 38

M = 5.49,
SD = 0.97
n = 113

Total

M = 5.52,
SD = 0.99
n = 117

M = 5.50,
SD = 1.12
n = 118

M = 5.15,
SD = 1.07
n = 115

M = 5.39,
SD = 1.07
n = 350
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Table 15
Christian sample cell means for trustworthiness
Identity Cue:

None (Control)

Religious

Sports

Total

Control Message

M = 5.42,
SD = 0.96
n = 29

M = 5.38,
SD = 1.16
n = 31

M = 4.73,
SD = 1.18
n = 28

M = 5.19,
SD = 1.14
n = 88

Specific Reasoning

M = 5.48,
SD = 1.07
n = 31

M = 6.00,
SD = 1.01
n = 30

M = 5.53,
SD = 1.12
n = 29

M = 5.67,
SD = 1.08
n = 90

Pseudo-Reasoning

M = 5.56,
SD = 0.88
n = 26

M = 5.84,
SD = 0.85
n = 25

M = 5.34,
SD = 0.84
n = 27

M = 5.57,
SD = 0.87
n = 78

Total

M = 5.48,
SD = 0.97
n = 86

M = 5.73,
SD = 1.05
n = 86

M = 5.21,
SD = 1.10
n = 84

M = 5.47,
SD = 1.06
n = 256
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Table 16
Football fan cell means for message acceptance
Identity Cue:

None (Control)

Religious

Sports

Total

Control Message

M = 4.54,
SD = 1.10
n = 13

M = 4.61,
SD = 1.02
n = 17

M = 4.06,
SD = 0.89
n = 14

M = 4.41,
SD = 1.01
n = 44

Specific Reasoning

M = 4.78,
SD = 1.17
n = 18

M = 4.96,
SD = 1.24
n = 19

M = 5.38,
SD = 1.17
n=9

M = 4.84,
SD = 1.19
n = 46

Pseudo-Reasoning

M = 5.10,
SD = 0.58
n = 16

M = 4.57,
SD = 1.46
n = 18

M = 4.78,
SD = 0.75
n = 20

M = 4.80,
SD = 1.01
n = 54

Total

M = 4.82,
SD = 0.99
n = 47

M = 4.72,
SD = 1.24
n = 54

M = 4.67,
SD = 1.00
n = 43

M = 4.74,
SD = 1.09
n = 144
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Chapter 4 Tables
Table 17
Surveyed sample descriptives, alphas, and correlations
Variables

M, SD, α

1

2

3

1. SA

5.60, 1.02, .61

2. TRU

5.39, 1.07, .84

.51**

3. BEL

5.90, 1.20, .85

.42**

.69**

4. COMP

4.70, 1.13, n/a

.23*

.16

-.02

5. SU

4.10, 1.08, .80

-.21*

-.35**

-.37**

4

.04

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01; SA = social attractiveness, TRU = trustworthiness, BEL =
believability, COMP = compliance, SU = self-uncertainty. COMP is a single factor.

Table 18
Descriptives and factor loadings for social attractiveness
Items
I think he/she could be a friend of mine.
I would like to have a friendly chat with her/him.
We could never establish a personal friendship with
each other.
He/she just wouldn't fit into my circle of friends.
Note: Italicized items are reverse-coded.

M

SD

Min-Max

5.52
5.60

1.54
1.50

1-7
1-7

5.18

1.81

1-7

6.11

1.09

2-7

Factor
Loadings
.85
.90
.48
.06
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Table 19
Descriptives and factor loadings for trustworthiness
Items
Honest ... Dishonest
Untrustworthy ... Trustworthy
Moral ... Immoral
Phoney ... Genuine
Note: Italicized items are reverse-coded.

Factor
Loadings
.84
.84
.76
.64

M

SD

Min-Max

6.06
5.99
5.65
5.85

1.29
1.20
1.78
1.44

2-7
2-7
1-7
1-7

M

SD

Min-Max

5.94
5.64
5.67
5.81

1.38
1.52
1.46
1.32

1-7
1-7
2-7
2-7

M

SD

Min-Max

2.41

1.60

1-7

Factor
Loadings
.59

2.85

1.72

1-7

.75

3.03

1.84

1-7

.81

2.24

1.40

1-7

.66

Table 20
Descriptives and factor loadings for believability
Items
Agree ... Disagree
False ... True
Incorrect ... Correct
Yes ... No
Note: Italicized items are reverse-coded.

Factor
Loadings
.78
.76
.80
.71

Table 21
Descriptives and factor loadings for self-uncertainty
Items
I feel that I am not really the person I appear to be.
When I think about the kind of person I’ve been in
the past, I’m not sure what I was really like.
If I were asked to describe my personality, my
description might end up being different from one
day to another.
In general, I have a clear sense of who I am and
what I am.
Note: Italicized item is reverse-coded.
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Table 22
Full data cell means for compliance
Identity Cue:

None (Control)

Religious

University

Total

Control Message

M = 2.60,
SD = 1.19
n = 48

M = 2.17,
SD = 1.28
n = 41

M = 2.24,
SD = 1.40
n = 49

M = 2.35,
SD = 1.30
n = 138

Specific Reasoning

M = 2.73,
SD = 1.30
n = 44

M = 2.34,
SD = 1.45
n = 35

M = 2.51,
SD = 1.04
n = 35

M = 2.54,
SD = 1.27
n = 114

Pseudo-Reasoning

M = 2.68,
SD = 1.18
n = 50

M = 2.62,
SD = 1.47
n = 37

M = 2.81,
SD = 1.28
n = 38

M = 2.70,
SD = 1.29
n = 123

Total

M = 2.67,
SD = 1.21
n = 142

M = 2.37,
SD = 1.40
n = 113

M = 2.49,
SD = 1.28
n = 120

M = 2.52,
SD = 1.29
n = 375
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Table 23
Surveyed sample cell means for compliance
Identity Cue:

None (Control)

Religious

University

Total

Control Message

M = 3.10,
SD = 0.88
n = 10

M = 2.76,
SD = 0.97
n = 17

M = 2.89,
SD = 1.05
n=9

M = 2.35,
SD = 0.95
n = 36

Specific Reasoning

M = 3.50,
SD = 0.91
n = 12

M = 3.00,
SD = 1.23
n=9

M = 3.17,
SD = 1.17
n=9

M = 2.54,
SD = 1.09
n = 30

Pseudo-Reasoning

M = 3.44,
SD = 0.73
n=9

M = 3.78,
SD = 0.67
n=9

M = 3.39,
SD = 0.82
n = 10

M = 2.70,
SD = 0.79
n = 28

Total

M = 3.35,
SD = 0.84
n = 31

M = 3.09,
SD = 1.04
n = 35

M = 2.89,
SD = 0.98
n = 28

M = 3.13,
SD = 0.96
n = 94
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Table 24
Dummy-coded categorical effects
Variable:

SA

TRU

BEL

COMPa

COMPb

Specific
Reason

R = .23,
p = .07

R = -.04,
p = .74

R = -.07,
p = .60

R = .14,
p = .27

R = .08,
p = .23

Pseudoreason

R = .04,
p = .74

R = -.06,
p = .64

R = -.04,
p = .75

R = .28,
p = .03

R = .13,
p = .03

Religious

R = -.08,
p = .50

R = .07,
p = .59

R = -.03,
p = .80

R = -.14,
p = .26

R = -.11,
p = .07

University

R = -.08,
p = .55

R = -.09,
p = .51

R = -.15,
p = .25

R = -.23,
p = .08

R = -.07,
p = .25

Note: SA = social attractiveness; TRU = trustworthiness; BEL = believability; COMPa =
compliance, survey sample; COMPb = compliance, full sample. Message factor correlations
calculated with control groups (no reason, no identity cue) as referents.
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